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FOREWORD
Despite decades of research and experience in foreign conflicts and fragile environments, institutions
in the United States and beyond are often unable to
position themselves for success when called upon to
intervene. This monograph contributes to the growing
recognition that today’s conflicts are best understood
as complex systems, characterized by greater levels
of fragility, uncertainty, and intractability than conflicts of previous decades. However, it does something
even more important along the way. It encourages us
to acknowledge that policy processes and institutions
designed to address foreign conflicts are themselves
complex systems. As a consequence, it is not just volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA)
environments that are unpredictable; how our own
policy decisions end up being implemented are also
unpredictable.
Decisions about policy and strategy are far from
simple. They are inputs into a complex web of institutions, processes, incentives, and bureaucratic cultures that shape and reshape those decisions in ways
that often end up quite different from their original
intent. The Army is only one component of this complex system. The rest of the U.S. Government is likewise embedded in this complex system that includes
other services, departments, agencies, and contractors.
These, in turn, are part of a global system of alliances
whose inner workings are complex as well.
The authors describe this phenomenon as the
“dual-system problem.” A decision about how to intervene is fed into a complex policy system that turns the
decision into a set of actions on the ground, which in
turn are fed into a complex conflict system that turns
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those decisions into a set of outcomes. If the effects
of a policy often seem disconnected from the motivations of the decision, it is because the recommended
actions had to make their way through two complex
systems—not exactly a recipe for success.
No wonder lessons are not always institutionalized. Research on best practices and doctrine generally
focus on the actions that took place on the ground, and
many of the lessons discovered and recommended to
decision-makers end up getting rediscovered and recommended over and over, in some cases over decades.
The authors encourage broadening the research and
policy agenda to focus specifically on why our own
institutions have so often failed to institutionalize
lessons; in other words, to study our own systems as
complex systems to find the sources of resistance. This
is a bold, innovative, and important piece that needs to
be taken seriously at all levels.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Conflicts are increasingly complex and unpredictable. The United States and its partners have not been
unambiguously successful at the strategic level in most
of the conflicts they have been engaged in since September 11, 2001. This is, in part, because conflicts are
becoming more complex and, therefore, more unpredictable and volatile; the parties to conflicts are more
fragmented yet more interconnected (domestically,
regionally, and internationally); and alliances among
combatants are increasingly formed out of expediency
or necessity rather than ideological alignment, trust, or
a desire for power sharing. In complex wars, it can be
unclear what winning might even look like from the
U.S. perspective.
The U.S. policy system is also more complex than
most leaders appreciate. The difficulty of operating in
fragile and conflict environments is exacerbated by the
fact that the U.S. policy system is also too complex to
manage predictably. However, it is still thought of as
a bureaucracy rather than what it actually is: a “complex system” (as scholars define the term). Complex
systems by their nature do not always turn inputs
(such as policy decisions) into predictable outcomes
(such as U.S. influence). Something usually gets lost in
translation.
The United States will not be effective in foreign
conflicts until it gets a handle on this “dual-system
problem.” The ability of U.S. leaders to influence
outcomes in crisis situations is restricted by the fact
that not one but two complex systems—the domestic
policy system and the foreign conflict—stand between
their decisions and the real-world outcomes they
want to influence. This is not due to maliciousness
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or incompetence in the federal workforce or military
forces, but rather to the nature of the system that has
been set up by the U.S. Congress and Presidents from
both political parties over the course of many decades.
The United States is better at providing humanitarian
assistance to mitigate the effects of war than it is at preventing, winning, or ending wars or at helping societies recover from them sustainably.
Complexity benefits spoilers more than established powers. State and nonstate actors looking to
undermine the global system and harm U.S. interests
have an advantage over large, successful countries
such as the United States. They are simply better positioned to respond to rapid changes in the complex conflict environments in which they operate. This is partly
because it is easier for small, flat organizations to innovate than it is for large and multifaceted organizations attempting to operate as hierarchies, and partly
because it takes significantly more energy, foresight,
and cooperation to maintain order than it does to disrupt order.
Complexity weakens the effectiveness of international legal instruments. When decision-makers
associated with supranational legal institutions fail to
account for the complexity of policy and conflict systems, international criminal law becomes a weak tool
for helping decision-makers achieve their objectives,
whether those objectives are strategic or humanitarian. International law has real normative power, but in
complex settings, that normative power is not always
strong enough to deter or prosecute perpetrators of
atrocities. Conflict actors generate and follow their
own rogue norms of behavior, which can effectively
counterbalance established legal norms. The inclusion of both sets of rules and actors—established and
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rogue—can therefore exacerbate rather than reduce
the complexity of conflict settings and thus the ability
to influence conflict outcomes.
Experts already know what reforms are needed.
A great deal of research on approaches that are and
are not effective in complex environments points to
the importance of, among other insights, simplifying
or harmonizing the way support to in-country partners is delivered, engaging affected communities and
marginalized groups in solutions, taking seriously the
advice of experts and the opinions of citizens, investing in preventive work in fragile environments before
they turn violent, clearly articulating the objectives of
an intervention, giving field offices the authority to
respond with agility in fast-changing situations, allowing staff to experiment and learn from failure without being punished for taking calculated risks, and
empowering and rewarding entrepreneurial staff as
they discover and implement effective innovations.
Figuring out how to implement those reforms
remains the key challenge. Experts spend more time
recommending the aforementioned practices than
studying the sources of resistance to their effective
implementation. There are established methods in
the social sciences for studying “policy resistance”
(e.g., political economy analysis and system dynamics modeling), but conflict scholars, policy advisers,
research centers, and doctrine writers rarely employ
them to discover the barriers to success within the U.S.
policy system. While it remains critically important to
produce doctrine, discover lessons, and identify best
practices for effective action in complex environments,
such documents far too often recommend that troops,
civilians, contractors, and agencies take actions and
produce results that their own policy system will never
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allow them to actually deliver (e.g., “whole-of-government”) in the absence of significant reforms—a topic
about which the authors of such documents rarely
express curiosity. The domestic barriers to becoming
more entrepreneurial, more experimental, and more
systemic in complex environments have yet to be studied systematically. Unless we develop a more sophisticated understanding of the complexity of our own
systems—and more effective practices for operating
through them—political leaders of the future, frustrated by the impotency of existing systems, might be
tempted to bypass democratic processes and impose
in their place more linear processes (e.g., command
and control). That might help decision-makers get
more immediate results, but linear processes are even
worse at predicting second-order effects than current
approaches, and they are more likely, therefore, to produce results that run counter to the long-term interests
and values of the American people.
The military services have the motivation and
resources to lead a shift in emphasis from a command-and-control mindset in policymaking to a systemic mindset. There will always be a place in military
institutions for commanders to expect subordinates
to obey orders, and there will always be an expectation by elected and appointed civilian leaders that
their decisions will be implemented with their intent
intact. However, whole-of-government implementation is a failed dream; there are too many sources of
resistance to full interagency coordination within the
policy system. Shifting from “whole-of-government”
to “systemic governance” is therefore a necessity, and
the Army has the motivation and resources to lead that
shift. Officers from lieutenant colonel through brigadier general need to be trained and educated in a way

xiv

that inculcates a systemic mindset in themselves and,
at the very least, encourages them to recognize and
reward experimental and entrepreneurial tendencies
in their subordinates. Education, training, and doctrine
institutions are designed to adapt as global conditions
change, and the key adaptation today is to become
more systemic, more entrepreneurial, and more experimental, particularly on planning, joint concepts, doctrine, wargaming, and force development. That is as
true for political leaders and civilian agencies as it is
for military organizations. All will need to solve the
dual-system problem before they can expect to protect
U.S. interests and contribute to a stable international
order in the future.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The United States and its partners have not been
unambiguously successful at the strategic level in most
of the conflicts they have engaged in since September
11, 2001. In some cases, conflicts that had seemed settled erupted again under different guises. Combatants
that had appeared defeated emerged under different
names. Partners that had seemed reliable turned out
to have different agendas, loyalties, or capabilities
than expected. Successful battles and targeted strikes
have rarely, if ever, been accompanied by the broader
political settlements or unambiguous victories needed
for strategic-level success. In short, tactics, alliances,
motives, and players shift so quickly that existing analytic “conflict lenses” sometimes make today’s conflicts look more kaleidoscopic than focused—shift your
perspective just a little and the whole picture seems to
change.1
In the face of the complex and uncertain challenges
that arise in today’s conflicts—certain only to get worse
over time—how should the U.S. Government organize
and position itself to protect its interests and contribute to a stable international order in the future? Some
scholars and practitioners have suggested the answer
lies in finding ways to be more adaptive and innovative—more like startups and venture capitalists than
government bureaucracies. What does that mean in
practice? What are the systemic challenges the United
States would need to overcome to prepare adequately
for conflicts that realistically are not likely to be susceptible to normal planning? More to the point, when
U.S. troops are asked to go to war, how can they build
strategies, plan operations, fight battles, and build
relationships when the conflict environments are so
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complex that it is not always clear what victory would
look like? Moreover, the demands of interagency coordination are so unrealistic that it is also not clear what
a “whole-of-government” effort would even entail.
Chapter 1 addresses these questions. Chapter 2
considers trends suggesting that conflicts are decreasing in number but increasing in complexity and intractability. Chapter 3 shares the results of three lines of
research we undertook over the past year: expert
interviews and workshops soliciting ideas for feasible, immediate reforms; an experimental public forum
on support for various approaches to intervention;
and a 3-day, 30-party simulation of a complex conflict
negotiation.2
Given those findings, chapter 4 introduces the concept of the “dual-system problem” to demonstrate
why many countries and international institutions
are ill-suited to engaging successfully in complex conflicts.3 The policy systems attempting to solve complex
problems are, in fact, complex systems themselves.
We illustrate the dual-system problem with two cases:
institutions for learning lessons from experience
(knowledge) and those for protecting against atrocities
(law). When knowledge institutions and legal institutions fail to account for complexity and the dual-system problem, they do not fully achieve their intended
purpose in the domain of complex conflicts, leading to
unnecessary and deadly mistakes and failures to deter
or punish atrocities.
The final chapter argues, pessimistically, that the
United States, like the international community more
broadly, is not presently organized to deal with the
complex conflicts it is already engaged in beyond
humanitarian assistance. The best we likely can expect
is skilled improvisation, lucky breaks, and slow
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progress. More hopefully, however, we discuss the
opportunities and challenges involved in the necessity
of making the United States, its allies, and international
organizations more entrepreneurial, more experimental, and more systemic so they will be better positioned
to engage more intelligently and strategically in complex situations of the future. The U.S. Army sits on the
boundary between the U.S. policy system and the complex conflict systems it is asked to fight. It is therefore
not only required to figure out how to overcome the
dual-system problem, it is also perfectly positioned to
help the U.S. Government more broadly identify the
kinds of reforms that will be needed.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1
1. David Crane, a lawyer and international prosecutor whose
research is focusing on a potential war-crimes case against Bashar
al-Assad, coined the term “kaleidoscopic conflict” to describe the
complex war in Syria and the likely trajectory of warfare in the
future. Personal communication, November 2015.
2. The simulation and some of the expert consultations were
undertaken in collaboration with the International Peace and Security Institute (IPSI), Washington, DC; and the authors would
like to thank IPSI’s Cameron Chisholm, Kevin Melton, Kate Elci,
and David Crane for their assistance. Many of the expert consultations were also undertaken in collaboration with the Fragility
Study Group, co-chaired by Nancy E. Lindborg (United States
Institute of Peace), Michèle A. Flournoy (Center for a New American Security, Washington, DC), and William J. Burns (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC). The authors would like to thank the study group co-chairs along with
Alexa Courtney, Linwood Ham, Noah Sheinbaum, Loren DeJonge Schulman, and Matan Chorev for their assistance.
3. The authors introduced the dual-system problem in Robert D. Lamb and Melissa R. Gregg, “Preparing for Complex Conflicts,” Fragility Study Group Policy Brief, No. 7, Washington, DC:
United States Institute of Peace, October 2016.
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CHAPTER 2. COMPLEX SYSTEMS
AND CONFLICT
Evidence is accumulating that conflicts are increasing in complexity. Today’s wars tend to involve more
uncertainty, more volatility, and more actors with
domestic, regional, or international affiliations than in
the past. Parties to conflict are increasingly likely to be
highly fragmented, use interconnected social networks
(proximate or distant), and engage in competitive alliances out of expediency or necessity rather than ideological alignment, trust, or a desire for power sharing.
Even after active combat ceases, the instability of these
alliances can increase the likelihood of conflict recurrence and disrupt the transition to peace. In complex
wars, it can be unclear what winning might even look
like.1
For example, the war in Syria is, by any measure,
complex. Even from just the perspective of U.S. interests, it is hard to articulate what a winning strategy
would be. The Syrian regime and the Islamic State are
fighting each other, and throughout 2016, the United
States opposed both. Therefore, it supported, for example, Kurdish fighters who also opposed both. Turkey is
also a U.S. ally and a key regional power that opposed
not only the Islamic State, but the Kurds as well. As
such, it is therefore only a slight exaggeration to argue
that almost anything the United States attempted in the
region risked both supporting and opposing its adversaries while opposing and supporting its partners.
Fragility has a similar complexity. The “absence
or breakdown of a social contract between people
and their government,” as the Fragility Study Group
defined the term,2 is generally reflected in a lack of
consensus over the system of governance that different
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populations within a defined territory would consider
legitimate. When a governance system suffers from
“deficits of institutional capacity and political legitimacy that increase the risk of instability and violent
conflict and sap the state of its resilience to disruptive
shocks,”3 the result is that different political groupings find ways to fend for themselves. They ally with
other groups when convenient, compete with others
for resources and influence, carve out their own safe
spaces where possible, partner with outside patrons
when necessary, and communicate different narratives
to different audiences to maximize whatever benefit
can be achieved. In a sense, fragility is a complex conflict that has not yet turned violent.
Chapter 2 begins with a review of these trends and
a discussion of the challenges of managing complex
conflicts. Informally, we consider a conflict to be complex if it involves at least three distinct sets of direct
combatants; uncertain or unstable alliances of convenience among them (if any); a degree of fragmentation
within at least one major combatant group; relationships between combatants and external supporters
who themselves are competitors of some sort; and
uncertain, shifting or opaque motivations, rationales,
and objectives for engaging in combat by at least one
major combatant group.
More formally, we consider conflicts to be systems, and complex conflicts to be complex or dynamic
systems. This chapter therefore introduces some key
insights from the theoretical literature on systems,
cybernetics, complexity, and conflict. Systems are
always defined in terms of their boundary, which
clearly delineates the (endogenous) factors that are
components or elements of the system from (exogenous) factors or phenomena that can be treated as
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separate from the system. In some traditions, systems are said to absorb inputs from sources outside
the system and produce outputs or outcomes into the
environment. In other traditions, the boundary of the
system is drawn more widely so that the key variables
of interest are considered not as inputs and outputs but
as parts of (endogenous to) the system itself.4 Planning
frameworks and theories of change generally employ
the terminology of inputs, outputs, and outcomes.
We will use that terminology as well, with the caveat
that experts in system dynamics—whose work is most
immediately useful to those wishing to understand
conflict and policy systems—tend to shy away from
that language, preferring to endogenize all variables of
interest―inputs are treated as decision variables, and
outputs are treated as state variables or simply variables of interest.
In conflicts, inputs can include weapons, money,
recruits, knowledge, diplomatic cover, and so on; and
outputs can include level of violence, form of violence,
control of territory, power, legitimacy, and many other
indicators of interest. Inputs from all sources—not
just American weapons but Russian weapons, Saudi
money, and European recruits, for example—flow
through and between the various components inside
the system and are transformed along the way, producing outputs that often are hard to predict or are counterintuitive (e.g., arming the enemies of your enemy
ends up strengthening your enemy). Large inputs
sometimes have no discernable effect on outputs, while
small inputs can sometimes have very large effects.
The components of complex systems are interrelated
in such a way that two or more variables can end up
forming circular causation or feedback loops. Positive
or reinforcing feedback loops amplify the effects its
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component variables have on each other. Negative or
balancing feedback loops counteract each other. Causal
relationships can be hard to detect because “in complex dynamic systems, causes are often far removed in
both time and space from the symptoms.”5
Based on these insights, the final section of this
chapter offers a simple conceptual framework through
which options for how to engage in complex conflicts
might be considered. Conceptually, strategic options
can be found in factors related to inputs, system components, outputs, and feedback or iteration. This discussion will be useful background for subsequent
chapters that lay out the strategic and policy challenges
and the reforms needed to overcome them.6
ARE CONFLICTS BECOMING MORE COMPLEX?
It has been observed that the number of conflicts
that begin every year has been generally declining for
at least 2 decades, and the number of people killed in
wars every year has been declining for many more
decades than that. Those downward trends were due
mainly to the absence of conventional global-scale
wars since the end of World War II and to the development of more precise weapons and tactics. There is no
guarantee that a global-scale conventional or hybrid
war will not emerge in the coming years or decades, of
course. However, the general trend has been promising. Less promising are much more recent observations
(in the past 3 or 4 years) that the annual number of conflicts might have increased again, that conflicts now
seem increasingly likely to recur once combat ceases,
that the number of battle deaths per war might be
increasing as well, and that some conflicts seem simply
immune to exhaustion. Syria, for example, represents
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both the deadliest war since the end of the Cold War
(e.g., half of the world’s casualties in 2012 occurred
within its borders) and one of the most complex, given
the number and interrelationships of domestic and foreign parties involved.7
Conflicts today, therefore, seem increasingly characterized by more uncertainty, intractability, and volatility than they were in the Cold War era.8 The World
Development Report from 2011 noted “few countries
are truly post-conflict” because so many had become
trapped in repeated cycles of violence, exclusion, and
fragility.9 Though there has been a relative dearth of
research on conflict persistence compared to that on
triggers of “new” conflicts, factors associated with
intractability generally include state capacity, economic
strength, weak institutions, and poor governance.10
Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Måns Söderbom in
2004 estimated the risk of conflict relapse to be approximately 40 percent during the first post-conflict decade,
meaning that almost half of all conflicts were destined
to resume.11 It is unclear whether the number of parties to a conflict drives conflict duration, intensity, or
recurrence (or vice versa), but it is clear that economic
fragility and protracted social tensions are mutually
reinforcing, a phenomenon the Center for Systemic
Peace describes as “systemic deterioration and societal
atrophy through the diffusion of insecurity.”12
Given that fragile environments are essentially
conflict zones that have not yet turned violent, trends
in fragility can stand as leading indicators for the ways
groups might form during conflict and the degree to
which group membership might endure throughout
a conflict. The 2016 Fragile States Index (FSI) found a
global increase in fragility overall, demonstrating “justified pessimism for the outlook for much of the world
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as continuing crises show little indication of resolution,
and new threats begin to arise.”13 Patterns of fragility
can explain some of the ways conflict cycles are evolving, lending nuance to our understanding of not just
conflict but also the likelihood of foreign interventions
into organized violence and the viability of a transition to peace. In one study, fragility was found to be
the single most important determinant for U.S. interventions into a transitioning state.14 Another found
that U.S. interventions into foreign crises were more
likely where there was more violence, greater strategic interests, or fewer regional constraints.15 Yet, it has
been acknowledged by senior officials that the ability
of foreign powers to manage or prevent fragility successfully is highly limited.16
In the absence of consensus on basic questions of
governance and legitimacy, when different social and
political groups start to feel insecure, they look for new
ways to fend for themselves. This may involve setting
aside some differences and allying with other groups
or patrons (domestically or internationally) when convenient, competing with other groups for resources
and influence, carving out their own safe spaces where
possible, and communicating different narratives to
different audiences to maximize whatever benefit can
be achieved. Fragile environments are often characterized by multiple, and sometime opaque, intersections
between and among military organizations, violent
organized criminals, and ethnic or political leaders.17
Fragility, complexity, and violence, therefore, are all
mutually reinforcing—one reason policy entry into
such environments is so notoriously difficult.
The complexity of fragile and conflict environments
does not always stay contained within the few geographical regions where they tend to originate, most
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notably the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
While some scholars note that conflict risk factors may
be geographically clustered, there is also a substantial likelihood of conflict “spillover,” either from the
“contagion” effect conflict can have on neighboring
countries or because of refugee flows from the conflict
zone.18 As refugee movements become increasingly
divorced from conflict sites, humanitarian crises affect
more and more states and the chance of international
involvement in armed conflict increases—which only
further increases the conflict’s complexity.19 It does not
stop there. A rapid increase (or perceived increase) of
refugees into an otherwise politically and economically stable country can also complicate local politics.
For example, hardline, nationalistic, and anti-immigrant political parties are coming into direct conflict
with European governments and refugee groups,
hardening ideological divisions and capitalizing on
the uneasiness of Western governments in managing
refugee flows.20 Interconnectedness and porous borders are no longer concerns merely of neighboring
nations; crisis spillover now has a global impact that
can be felt socially, economically, and politically across
the world.
All of this suggests that contemporary conflicts are
undoubtedly becoming more complex. They involve
greater numbers of actors, with a variety of intentions
and aims that have the possibility of shifting over time.
They are significantly more difficult to bring to a close,
are spread across large distances, and the chance of
a recurrence of violence is far greater. Despite widespread acknowledgment that the nature of conflict
has shifted to something altogether more difficult to
manage, researchers and practitioners persist in recommending many of the same solutions that either
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have failed outright in previous conflicts or have only
worked in environments that involved fewer elements
of complexity.
ARE CONFLICTS BECOMING HARDER TO
MANAGE?
Just as conflict occurrence appears to be rising once
again, so too are rates of peacekeeping and mediation. International mediation has risen by approximately 35 percent since the 1980s, although both the
rates of mediation and its success have remained low
in instances of civil war.21 While it remains difficult to
find consistent trends in international commitment
to crisis outcomes, more countries seem to be getting
involved in armed conflicts when they do occur.22 But
there is by far no consensus on whether, how, and to
what extent foreign bodies should step in and mediate
during a conflict, intervene diplomatically or militarily
(on the basis of humanitarian interests), or even force a
political transition.
It is clear, however, that once external actors do
intervene in a complex conflict, they become endogenous to the conflict itself.23 It is unrealistic to assume
that international actors can maintain a distant role in
a complex conflict, as external actors are often funding,
providing training, or otherwise serving as a resource
base for actors on the ground, and as such, they can
be seen as integral to the conflict outcome as any local
actor. Thus, peacebuilding and conflict mediation are
notoriously difficult in complex conflicts, as all of the
aforementioned group dynamics mitigate the likelihood of achieving a “mutually hurting stalemate”—
the point at which all parties to conflict recognize that
continuing to fight will only yield losses of lives and
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territory and instead begin to implement nonviolent
peace processes.24 With more external actors involved
in a conflict, combatants have more options for external
alliances and therefore more options for alliance shifting, which in turn gives them the perception of having
more options for avoiding “mutual hurt.” If increasing the options for alliances enhances the opacity of
groups’ intentions, all parties stand to gain more from
perpetuating conflict than from ending it. Thus, alliances risk becoming inherently tenuous and prone to
failure; during mass violence, they may either exacerbate existing tensions or generate new ones, complicating reconciliation efforts and damaging the possibility
of enduring peace.25 In post-conflict settings, these
shifts in alliances serve an equally dangerous role by
increasing the chances of conflict recurrence or, at a
minimum, posing a disruption to the transition to
peace.26
If an increase in the number of actors intervening in
a conflict makes that conflict more complex and therefore more difficult to manage, then there are several
ways to reduce that complexity. One is to refrain altogether from taking part in the conflict; the other is to
coordinate action in an alliance so some of the outside
actors behave as if they are a single unit.
Regarding inaction, research on U.S. interventions
has found that most foreign internal crises, especially
those with low levels of violence, are already ignored
unless they touch on serious strategic interests.27 Other
research has considered whether “strategic inaction”
allows global powers to avoid intensifying problems
under the guise of solving them, which would have
the effect of reducing the number of actors involved
in the conflict, therefore reducing its complexity and,
in theory, its intractability.28 There is also potentially
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more to be gained at the domestic level from refraining from intervening in foreign conflicts, because
public opinion tends to be against foreign interventions except in cases of self-defense or severe humanitarian harm.29 There was a particularly strong public
sentiment against interventions into the Syrian crisis;
in 2012, nearly two-thirds of Americans surveyed
believed the United States should take less responsibility for the conflict and reduce its involvement.30
As for alliances, those that succeed in coordinating
their policies and roles in an intervention can mitigate
some of the complications of having multiple actors
operating independently. Alliances can serve key
political purposes, both at home and abroad, because
they remove several downsides of unilateral action:
they spread the burden and costs of intervening across
multiple parties, represent more of an international
consensus than unilateral action, and ensure military
capacity and capital investment remain available to
respond to other crises domestically or elsewhere.31
The idea of managing complex conflicts by reducing complexity via alliance coordination is appealing
in principle, but it is significantly harder to incentivize multilateral interventions where the outcome does
not pose an existential threat to the homeland. The
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was
intended to be a venue through which the “coalition
of the willing” could unify its strategy in Afghanistan.
In practice, different countries took responsibility for
different regions, and the different capabilities and
domestic political pressures of participants ended up
producing something rather short of unified action. It
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turns out complex conflicts are hard to manage in part
because of the “managers” themselves.
They are also hard to manage simply because,
within the conflict, there are so many different actors
operating at so many different levels. Western diplomacy is designed to take place state-to-state, which
means the default interlocutors tend to be at the
national level, not at subnational levels. In today’s context, however, much of global mobilization is focused
on getting the parties to stop fighting or to mitigate
humanitarian harms, rather than on simply trying to
win the war. Conflict management cannot simply be
a matter of taking the government’s side or the insurgent’s side.32 There is substantial evidence that subnational and regional dynamics are at least as central to
the outcomes of today’s conflicts as national dynamics.33 For example, Stathis Kalyvas has argued that
it is impossible to fully understand the nuances of
violence at the macro (i.e., state) level without close
consideration of micro (i.e., local) dynamics.34 Government-level motivations for conflict may differ wildly
from those locally, but the tendency of researchers and
policymakers to “project backwards” the drivers of
conflict from a state level to an individual level means
that local cleavages are not fully considered and, therefore, cannot be adequately repaired. The interactions
between supra-local and local actors and the transfer of
power from the former to the latter informs the ways in
which conflicts endure or collapse, the character of violence, and the likelihood of peace sustainability in the
long term.35 However, little is known about the nature
of the interactions between those groups, as research
concentrates so heavily at the central governmental
level. Subnational conflict remains undertheorized
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and underappreciated, and it is at that level where a
conflict’s complexity is most opaque.36
SYSTEMS, COMPLEXITY, AND CONFLICT
IN THEORY
Having concluded that conflicts are indeed increasing in complexity and getting harder to manage, the
question of what to do about it remains. Most scholarly
approaches to conflicts over the last several decades
have framed them as linear processes tracing causal
factors (often singularly) such as geography, environmental factors, the presence or absence of natural
resources, ideological or social cleavages, power differentials in government, state fragility, aid flows, and
myriad other possibilities.37 Earlier studies also tended
to involve large-n, cross-country comparisons (which
average out intrastate violence) and suffered from
definitional inconsistencies that hampered their application to different conflict types.38
In reality, conflicts are the product of interconnecting factors both endogenous and exogenous to the
actors and countries involved. Theories examining
only a few facets therefore miss the feedback processes
occurring between different elements of a crisis, are
unable to capture shifts in motivations and ideologies
over time, and do not adequately differentiate between
those factors motivating an initial descent into conflict
and those influencing the perpetuation of violence.
In myriad ways, today’s conflicts exemplify “wicked
problems”: they are difficult to define; their root causes
are often interlinked and difficult to separate; and it
is not certain at any time where the appropriate level
may be for intervention purposes.39
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For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, we frame
problems in terms of system dynamics and complexity. These are highly interdisciplinary fields, having
evolved to incorporate elements of mathematics, physics, environmental sciences, psychology, sociology, and
more recently, political science.40 As with any interdisciplinary practice, different authors define their terms
and frame the domain of their research in different and
at times contradictory ways. Because the purpose of
our research is expository rather than explanatory, we
have the luxury of being able to simplify, for the sake
of the reader, an otherwise complicated subject.
Systems theory and complexity theory are closely
related. Both see certain problems as inherently
dynamic and nonlinear; that is, an increase or decrease
in one factor cannot reliably predict an increase or
decrease in another factor without additional information, such as initial or earlier values of the factors
involved or the level to which some resources have
been accumulated. Both also place scale, boundaries, and hierarchy at the center of analysis: systems
can contain subsystems, but they can also themselves
be a subsystem within a higher-order system as well
(see, for example, the discussion of international law
as a subsystem in chapter 4). The observer or analyst
tries to select the level and boundaries of the unit of
analysis in such a way that all significant causal mechanisms are accounted for, although in practice, boundaries are at times selected for convenience or to focus
on particular sets of issues.41 A conflict whose major
players lie within a country’s borders will be studied
at the national level, so subnational dynamics would
be included in the analysis, while regional and international actors might be excluded from the analysis,
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and treated as inputs rather than components of the
system.
Both complexity and systems theories recognize
that, when humans and other organisms are involved
in a complex system, they adapt over time, which
further complicates analysis and prediction. By analogy, weather is a complex system, but its components
cannot adapt; imagine how difficult weather prediction would be if raindrops could refuse to leave their
clouds or if some air molecules moved faster or slower
in response to guidance from a prophet. Adaptation
is therefore key to understanding complex social
systems.42
While complexity and systems theories are often
conflated, there are some differences in emphasis. Systems analysts tend to focus on identifying relationships
between different elements within a system, recognizing that they cannot be considered in isolation from
one other. Systems scholars generate a deeper understanding of complex settings and circumstances by
“identifying the causal relations between both physical and behavioral components that together provide
an explanation for the behaviors of the system as a
whole.”43 System dynamics researchers are thus able
to analyze (on an ongoing basis) system components
and processes and, at the macro level, dynamics and
trajectories. In some theoretical frameworks, inputs
describe the resources required to carry out a service
or process or to generate a product. These may include
people, goods, capital, information, or even time. In
turn, outputs describe the by-products and outcomes
that the system produces. These are the results of a system’s work, and may be either tangible or intangible.
In addition to these critical functions, systems are also
defined by the presence of procedures, institutions,
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components, boundaries, and networks. These elements may be tightly coupled (that is, small changes
have big effects) or loosely coupled (small changes
have small effects). Crucial features of dynamic systems include the accumulation and depletion of
resources over time, the presence of feedback mechanisms, and delays between causes and effects, which
together make prediction difficult without the quantification and simulation of dynamic models.44
Within the realm of systems thinking, there are
sub-theories and modes of analysis. System dynamics focuses specifically on problems characterized by
ambiguity and unpredictable patterns, multi-scaled
analysis, and ignorance as to the correct policy choices
for resolution. With a dynamic approach, researchers
take more of a long-term, evolutionary, and historical
view of issues. As a result, dynamic complexity takes
cause-and-effect, feedback, and stability and fluctuations in a system over time as a core feature of analysis.45 In control theory, attention is paid to one or more
measures of the state of the system (state variables)
so that information can be used to adjust iteratively
inputs in response, the way a thermostat continuously
measures a room’s temperature (the state variable),
then turns the heating or cooling element (the input)
on or off, depending on whether the room is within a
desired temperature range. Adaptive systems theory
expands on the idea that systems may “learn” from
their environment, shifting in response to information
gathered. Such evolution may be positive, in the sense
that the system self-corrects, but also negative in the
sense that individual components within the system
have the power to drive macro-level changes and
system-level learning may not take place at the same
speed as the stimuli causing the need for a shift.46 Such
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gaps in timing form a core challenge to those involved
in complex conflicts. Complexity theorists tend to
focus on the unpredictability of the system under analysis—for example, on positive feedback loops that can
push a system beyond equilibrium—rather than on
stability and equilibrium, as more linear approaches
take.47 Some systems (for example, an electronic circuit
or a business strategy) have a relatively high degree of
certainty and predictability in its outcomes and outputs, but in complex or chaotic settings (for example,
weather and war), there is perpetual uncertainty as to
the outcome.48 Complexity thinkers recognize change
as a continuous process, which requires those both
within and outside the system to adapt on an ongoing
basis. Being adaptive thus requires incorporating multiple perspectives, working dynamically, and favoring
flexibility over predictability.49
Conflict mapping is already a standard practice for
military and civilian planners, but complex conflicts
require attention to additional dynamics and adaptations that often generate unexpected consequences.
The usual approach to participating in conflicts is
linear: directly target system components considered
undesirable (e.g., combatants) and the obvious links
(e.g., finance and weapons flows) that support them, or
directly support certain actors (e.g., with training and
weapons) believed to oppose those adversaries. Strategists can be highly sophisticated at identifying potential second-order effects and complicated tradeoffs,
but not all are as systematic at identifying them as the
complexity of the situation demands, and even the
best strategies can be implemented in nonstrategic
ways. Training and equipping surrogate combatants,
for example, is a strategy sometimes referred to as an
“indirect approach” to warfare, implying a systemic
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mindset, but given how often train-and-equip programs are implemented with false assumptions and
little to no attention to second-order (and higher)
effects, it is hardly an example of sophisticated systems thinking or, often, successful strategy.50
Engaging in complex conflicts should, therefore,
be a matter of minimizing complexity where possible
(by disengaging or by harmonizing actions with other
actors), paying close attention to higher-order changes
in system components and the system as a whole, and
adapting as needed. Control theory is more useful in
systems theory than in complexity theory for a reason,
since it presumes there is an equilibrium state that the
system can achieve. With the addition of knowledge
about how system components interrelate inspired by
complexity theory, it can also provide a very rough
framework to identify strategic opportunities. They
can identify the inputs you can control (money, weapons, and information), as many interrelated system
components as is feasible, and the outcomes of greatest interest (i.e., state variables such as violence levels,
who controls what territory, etc.), then iteratively
activate the inputs, measure how the other variables
respond, and use that information to adjust the next
round of inputs.
A growing chorus of authors and analysts calls for
work in complex environments to be carried out along
these lines, through decentralized organizational
structures (“team of teams”) and people with local
knowledge, an entrepreneurial mindset, and incentives to experiment and innovate. They argue that logical frameworks, linear theories of change, inflexible
funding mechanisms, and other bad habits of large
bureaucracies inhibit the agility and experimentation required to learn to operate in environments that
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Thomas Jacobs called “VUCA”: volatile, uncertain,
complex, and ambiguous.51 In the next chapter, we
present the results of our own research that strongly
supports these claims and lays the foundation for the
subsequent diagnosis that these shortcomings are
rooted in our own complex systems.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH AND FINDINGS
Given that many of today’s conflicts are already
confounding, the trends toward complexity and intractability discussed in chapter 2 do not bode well for U.S.
involvement in conflicts as time moves forward. To
identify steps the United States can take to start building a more capable system, we pursued three lines of
research in addition to a review of literature on various
approaches to dealing with complex conflicts. These
included expert interviews and workshops soliciting ideas for feasible reforms; an experimental public
forum on support for various approaches to intervention; and a 3-day, 30-party simulation of a complex conflict negotiation to identify roadblocks to settlement.
EXPERT ENGAGEMENT ON DEALING WITH
COMPLEXITY
The authors collaborated with a number of organizations and initiatives in Washington, DC, and
interviewed experts at meetings and workshops in
Washington, Chicago, New York, and San Francisco
to explore the state of knowledge and ideas regarding
effective engagement in complex fragile and conflict
environments.
We collaborated with the Fragility Study Group, a
high-level senior working group launched in January
2016 by Nancy E. Lindborg of the United States Institute of Peace, Michèle A. Flournoy of the Center for a
New American Security, and William J. Burns of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, all in
Washington, DC. The group held three high-level, halfday workshops involving a bipartisan group of senior
experts, and one of the authors of this monograph, Dr.
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Robert Lamb, worked informally with the group’s staff
on some of the conceptual framing of its work. Its final
report was published in September 2016 and its principals asked us to publish a policy brief based on an
early draft of this monograph, the research for which
was happening in parallel.1
We also collaborated with the International Peace
and Security Institute (IPSI), Washington, DC, on its
Kaleidoscopic Conflict Project. This project, directed by
IPSI’s Kevin Melton, was an effort to generate hypotheses about: first, what private-sector practices might
be useful for governments to employ when engaging in complex conflict environments; and second,
what direct role the private sector might play in mitigating the causes and damages of complex conflicts.
This collaboration enabled us to travel to Chicago,
San Francisco, and New York (as well as The Hague,
the Netherlands, for the simulation discussed later) to
interview both private-sector experts on innovation
and effectiveness in complex environments and conflict experts whose views are not normally heard in the
Washington policy establishment.2
Including these collaborations, plus workshops
and interviews we conducted independently—but
excluding the public forum and simulation described
in the next two sections—the research presented in this
monograph has been informed by insights from more
than 200 experts, ranging from familiar ideas well represented in the literature to interesting thoughts worth
exploring.
The most useful set of insights that emerged
derives from an analogy with how entrepreneurs
encourage investors to help them start up new businesses, or rather how that startup process has evolved
over time. Economic competition has always involved
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a mix of conflict and cooperation, with a wide variety
of actors constantly shifting partners and buying patterns, building and losing trust in each other and the
system as a whole, innovating and failing to innovate,
adapting to the micro- and macro-level changes they
see and failing to adapt to those they miss, and being
destroyed or created in a constant churn. Succeeding
in such systems has always required a solid understanding of trends in customer demand and competition and a mindset capable of innovating, learning, and
adapting. Different ideas about success go in and out
of fashion over time, and how startups ask investors
for money has changed dramatically in the past 2 or
3 decades. In the simplest terms, startups once began
with a business model based on market research,
pitched it to investors as a set of arguments for why
they believe they will make money, then built the company and launched the product once full financing was
secured—and only then learned the hard way whether
the business model had correctly predicted customer
demand. Today, many investors expect something different: the startup begins with a provisional business
model, shares initial designs with potential customers to gauge interest, iteratively revises the business
model and product prototype based on their feedback,
then tries to sell a working prototype to real customers
to discover the specifications of a “minimally viable
product” (MVP) that will generate real revenue. At
each step of this “agile” or “lean” process, investors
offer just enough financing to get the startup to the
next stage, with the largest infusions coming only after
the business model is experimentally discovered and
validated with paying customers and the MVP is getting market traction.3
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Military organizations have long been aware that
war plans do not usually survive first contact with the
enemy. Organizations, agencies, and military departments whose work requires them to help or influence
people in fragile and complex environments are also
increasingly aware that, much like the older startup
processes, their standard approach too often leads
them to implement rigid plans. Frequently, this work
contractually requires them to implement rigid plans—
even when new knowledge about the local context
emerges or when the local context changes. The jargon
of lean startups and agile processes has increasingly
been adopted in these contexts, but practice has a very
long way to go. What needs to follow the shift in vocabulary is a shift in the mindsets of those engaged in this
work at all levels; even necessary changes in processes
will not make it possible to be more adaptive in these
environments unless accompanied by a cultural shift.
In particular, there are three mindsets that need to
be cultivated throughout military and civilian organizations involved in all stages of complex conflicts: a
systemic mindset, an entrepreneurial mindset, and an
experimental mindset.
• Systemic mindset. As suggested in chapter 2,
systems thinking represents a deep curiosity
about what the components of a system are,
how those components interact, what those
interactions mean for the system as a whole,
and what unexpected consequences are possible. Such a mindset, therefore: insists on identifying subsystems, feedback loops, and delayed
reactions, because they are sources of surprise;
requires the inclusion of marginalized groups
in plans and analyses, because they are part of
the system; and insists on using data and tools
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that make it possible to monitor changes in the
system as a whole and its key components,
and adjust and adapt quickly. Such a mindset
may have utility even in circumstances when a
system is founded on principles of consistency,
predictability, and order.
• Entrepreneurial mindset. A number of experts
interviewed for this research argued for the
need for more agile, innovative, adaptable,
and systematic approaches to foreign conflicts.
Many civilian and military personnel already
have an entrepreneurial mindset, and the best
become “intrapreneurs” within their institutions. Encouraging that mindset in others and
taking full benefit from it requires changes in the
incentives their institutions give them, particularly in the criteria used for career advancement.
Entrepreneurs take risks, accept failure, adapt,
and try again, but in institutions where failure
is punished, most people become highly riskaverse. An entrepreneurial mindset is needed
not just in personnel who plan and implement
projects, but also in back-office personnel (e.g.,
contracting, budgeting, personnel security, and
human resources). All should be trained to
know about how complex conflicts work and
should be given incentives that reward accountable innovations without punishing responsible
failures. An entrepreneurial approach would
provide budgets with flexible spending rules
so that resources can be shifted quickly from
losing projects to more promising alternatives
when needed. Military leaders sometimes get
flexible funding that enables them to be more
agile in the field, as with the Commanders
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Emergency Response Program that made such
funds available at the brigade level, but civilian
leaders usually face much stronger restrictions.
• Experimental mindset. Randomized controlled
trials are not possible (or likely ethical) in complex conflict environments, but natural experiments and opportunities to explore dynamics
are abundant if the right data can be collected
and enough decisionmakers would value evidence and learning. As one expert interviewed
for this project put it, “Everything we do should
be evidence-based or evidence-producing.”4 An
experimental mindset is one that treats all ideas
and plans as testable hypotheses and opportunities to learn, using and generating the best
information possible, questioning assumptions,
identifying hidden assumptions, and being
willing to learn from failures. In fact, an experimental mindset is central to the newer “lean”
startup processes, in which provisional business
plans are subjected to real-world experiments
with actual customers, and is therefore central
to any new approach to dealing with complex
conflicts.
PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT ON U.S. CONFLICT
POLICY
The American public tends to tolerate long wars of
low intensity and short wars of high intensity (i.e., large
numbers of U.S. troops engaged in combat), unless the
U.S. military is perceived to be winning. Complex wars
pose a special challenge in that it can be unclear what
winning might look like as noted earlier, and they tend

34

to last longer than is generally tolerated by the public.
Public support is important to any war effort because
in a democratic system, elected officials are expected
to (and often do) respond to the opinions of their constituents. Interventions can happen for many different reasons and in many different ways, but very few
public opinion surveys about U.S. involvement in foreign wars ask enough details (and those that do have
sometimes been criticized for framing questions in
ways that bias the results toward more intervention).5
Given that public support is a resource for any
response to a complex conflict, Dr. Lamb recruited an
informal focus group to participate in an experimental forum through which participants’ opinions were
sought about support for U.S. involvement in foreign
wars.6 Participants were asked to go to a website to
register and login. Once online, they were given the
following instructions:
On the next three pages, we’ll ask you a few questions
and suggest some options for how those questions
could be answered. 1. Vote. What do you think of each
option? Select an oval to score it (from “totally disagree”
to “totally agree”). 2. Discuss. Use the text box to share
your thoughts or respond to others’ comments—be civil!
3. Suggest. Think an answer is missing? Offer a new one
in the suggestion box at the bottom of the page [emphasis
in original].7

Participants were able to return to the forum as often
as they wanted, either to continue participating in the
discussion by adding or responding to comments or
to change their scoring if the discussion changed their
mind about their answers to any of the questions. The
three questions were:
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1. Some people in other countries appreciate the way the
United States deals with foreign conflicts. How right or
wrong do you think they are to say these [following]
things [emphasis in original]?
2. Sometimes people in other countries complain about
how the United States deals with foreign conflicts. How
right or wrong do you think they are to have these
[following] complaints [emphasis in original]?
3. Sometimes the United States intervenes in foreign
conflicts using military force. Sometimes we intervene
using mainly diplomacy or economic power, and
sometimes we do not intervene at all. What are some
good reasons that the United States should intervene
in a foreign conflict using military force [emphasis in
original]?8

The underlying technology was not a standard
survey instrument but an algorithm designed to find
areas of agreement among heterogeneous users.9 In
this consultation, there turned out to be more agreement on valid reasons to intervene than there was on
what the United States does right and wrong when it
does intervene. An analysis of the results suggests several key themes—prevention, self-defense, and protection—that should be pursued in greater depth in
future research.
• Prevent. A concern that the United States does
not “clearly communicate our reasons for getting involved” had the strongest and broadest
agreement in the questions about right and
wrong. But there was clear support for conflict
prevention (rather than conflict escalation): the
next three most agreed-upon answers were
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that the United States does not “excel at conflict prevention,” does “give weapons to too
many people,” and does “spend too much on
military response and not enough on conflict
prevention.”
• Defend. As reasons to intervene, there was
strong and broad opposition to going to war
“to remove or replace a political leader we
strongly disagree with” or “to transform a political system we strongly disagree with.” There
was strong and broad support for intervening
“to defend against a direct threat to American
territory”; “to defend vulnerable people (of any
nationality) from mass violence”; “to defend
our allies against direct threats”; and “to protect
Americans living or working abroad from mass
violence.”
• Protect. The discussions showed a clear desire
in general to protect civilians in combat zones,
but the results of the scoring were more ambiguous. Participants generally agreed that the
United States does “a lot to protect vulnerable
people in dangerous situations” and “protects
civilians in war zones more than other powers
do”—but it “doesn’t protect civilians and refugees enough” and “we kill too many innocents
when targeting enemies.” These responses bear
further study to determine whether they are
contradictory or reflect a sense that protecting
civilians is such an important part of the American identity that the United States could always
do better.
The key lesson to take from this forum is that there
are doubts across the political spectrum about the value
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of military interventions that do not involve protecting Americans, allies, or vulnerable populations—and
there is clear support for preventing conflict escalation. That suggests support for more involvement in
preventive work in fragile states, which are essentially
complex conflicts that have not yet turned violent
and are therefore excellent laboratories for learning
to engage constructively and systemically in complex
environments.
SIMULATION OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT NEGOTIATION
Since 2013, IPSI has been running a series of interactive simulations for use in its 3-week experiential-training programs, for early to mid-career professionals in
peacebuilding, political transitions, and international
justice.10 The exercise simulates an international negotiation to end a conflict in a fictional country called
Beladusham—similar in complexity to the war in
Syria, with elements of other multiparty conflicts in
the region—and involves 30-50 distinct roles played
out over 2 or 3 days.
At IPSI’s Hague Symposium in July 2016, Ms.
Melissa Gregg worked with IPSI to facilitate the simulation with 30 participants, who were instructed and
given incentives to experiment with innovative ways
to overcome both the simulation’s complexity and the
complications (called “injects”) that the facilitators
introduced throughout the activity. After the debrief
on the final day, participants completed a survey
asking how the complexity of the situation affected
their ability to achieve their goals, the steps participants took to overcome that complexity, and what
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they learned about operating in complex situations.
Five key themes emerged.
• Complexity suppressed innovation. Despite
2 weeks of training on innovative approaches
to peacebuilding, many participants found
that, as pressure and stress mounted, they fell
back into more familiar and simplistic ways to
try to achieve their goals. For example, when
it became clear there were too many different
actors with too many different mandates to
make progress through collective decisionmaking, many turned to coup attempts and coercive
diplomacy to get their way.
• Power suppressed participation. Participants
in weak roles (such as low-level opposition figures) found they had little to no influence in
negotiations, whereas those with veto power
in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
had significant influence over outcomes (and
tended to frame the outcome as a zero-sum
game). As the participant playing the UN Special Envoy observed, “We can’t even put issues
on the table unless the superpowers OK it.”
Poor access to constructive influence gave relatively weak actors reasons to consider achieving
their own goals by acting as spoilers to peace.
• Complexity suppressed the law. Despite the
presence of multiple characters representing the
international legal community, those actors were
unable to use either the threat of prosecutions or
the normative power of international criminal
law as effective deterrents to violence. Criminal
activity by the primary antagonists was blatant,
yet the legal group struggled to counteract this
behavior in a timely or proportionate manner.
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• Power counteracted innovation. The more
power participants had in the simulation, the
less likely they were to attempt innovative
approaches to achieving their goals. Those
representing great-power states threatened to
block aid, trade, or use their veto power in the
UNSC. Some nonstate actors, by contrast, were
much more creative in their attempts to form
alliances, and weaker actors managed to force
negotiations to continue, beyond a point when
they appeared intractable (by staging a sit-in,
for example).
• Complexity aided spoilers. Participants whose
mandates were to steer the peace talks toward
a successful conclusion found that complexity
was the enemy of stability and peace, while
those who were mandated to be spoilers found
complexity easier to harness to their advantage.
There are more ways for a situation to be disorderly or to be stable in a morally unacceptable
way than there is for it to be acceptably stable.
As the participant playing the main antagonist
put it, “The complexity actually gave me more
self-confidence and strength.”
The simulation raised two predominant conclusions. First, despite the fact that the simulation was
framed in a complex fashion and adaptability was
directly emphasized, participants nevertheless struggled to act outside of traditional realpolitik agendas.
Those whose goals were more flexible (both in terms of
alliances with other players and in terms of simulation
mandates) adapted more quickly and were better able
to achieve their goals than those who had significant
power but less flexibility. Second, legal approaches
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seemed entirely inadequate to resolving the conflict or
deterring spoilers, suggesting that significantly more
research is needed on the extent to which international
criminal law is suited to preventing or managing complex conflicts, a topic taken up in part of chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4. COMPLEXITY, POLICYMAKING,
AND THE DUAL-SYSTEM PROBLEM
Chapter 2 argued that conflicts are getting increasingly complex and therefore more unpredictable
and volatile; that parties to conflicts are increasingly
fragmented yet more interconnected (domestically,
regionally, and internationally); and that alliances are
increasingly formed and broken out of expediency or
necessity. Chapter 3 presented the results of research
suggesting that spoilers to peace have fundamental
advantages in complex environments; that large organizations originally designed as hierarchies have a
more difficult time adapting quickly than smaller, flatter organizations; and that public support for conflict
interventions tends to be higher for defense against
direct threats (such as attacks against the territorial
homeland) and lower for involvement in faraway
places and long periods of time—which describes most
complex conflicts.
Given those findings, chapter 4 argues that the
United States and other large, wealthy, democratic
countries are almost hopelessly ill-suited to engaging
successfully in complex conflicts at almost any phase,
from prevention through recovery, and that some international institutions (and international criminal law in
particular) lack the efficiency and flexibility to manage
or prevent complex conflicts as they occur. The U.S.
policy system is simply too complex to manage predictably, yet it is still thought of as a bureaucracy rather
than what it actually is: a complex system. That means
the ability of U.S. leaders to influence outcomes in crisis
situations is restricted by the fact that not one but two
complex systems stand between their decisions and
the real-world outcomes they want to influence. The
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domestic policy system is a complex system, and the
foreign conflict they want to influence is also a complex system. The United States will not be effective in
foreign conflicts until it gets a handle on this challenge,
which we call the “dual-system problem.”1
After introducing the concept of the dual-system
problem, we argue that the challenge complexity poses
to policymaking is not simply a matter of poor practice.
The challenge is more fundamental. Our institutions
are built on mental models of the world that simply no
longer match reality in important domains.
We illustrate this observation by discussing two
institutions that are little appreciated but invariably
involved at almost every stage of engagement with
complex conflicts: knowledge and law.2 Specifically,
we argue that, because institutions for learning lessons
from experience (knowledge) and protecting against
atrocities (law) have failed to account for complexity
and the dual-system problem, neither is fully achieving its intended purpose in the domain of complex
conflicts and both have therefore become inadequate
tools for helping decisionmakers achieve their objectives, whether strategic or humanitarian. In practice,
that means mistakes (sometimes deadly) are made
repeatedly, and violence against innocent people continues to go unpunished and undeterred. Again, these
problems are not merely failures of practice; they are
failures of imagination.
THE DUAL-SYSTEM PROBLEM
It is already widely acknowledged that conflicts
can be understood as complex systems. They have too
many interdependencies, feedback loops, and causal
delays for anyone to be able to reliably predict what
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immediate, second-order, and higher-order effects any
particular conflict inputs (such as weapons, money,
troops, diplomatic pressure, etc.) will have on conflict
outcomes (such as casualties, control of territory, legitimacy, etc.). The complexity, and therefore unpredictability, of conflicts has been growing for years.
It is less widely understood that policy processes—
for expert recommendations, policy decisions, operational plans, regulations, budgets, laws, evaluations,
lessons, doctrine, etc.—also add up to a complex
system. Decisions about foreign conflicts and fragile countries generally are made by high-level political appointees acting on information from high-level
intelligence officials and on advice from military officers, political appointees, civil servants, and outside
experts. They are implemented through offices led
by mid-level political appointees or military officers
constrained by budgets and rules enacted by elected
legislators, and they are also constrained by the established processes, knowledge, incentives, and mindsets
of all the offices responsible for approving, enabling,
and carrying out the decisions. They are constrained as
well by politics, competing geostrategic priorities, and
public opinion informed by real-time sources of horror
stories and propaganda. The recommendations and
decisions that go into a policy can be thought of as the
inputs into that system, and because the policy system
is complex, there is no guarantee that the system’s outputs—the actions taken by implementing agencies and
partners—will resemble what had actually been recommended or decided in the first place.
In other words, policy inputs (decisions about what
to do) are separated from conflict outcomes (success in
battle, protection of innocents, defeat of enemies, etc.)
by not one, but two unpredictable complex systems:
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the policy system and the conflict system. This is what
we mean by the “dual-system problem”―between
policy decisions and conflict outcomes, there are two
intervening complex systems.3 In systemic terms, policy-system inputs (recommendations and decisions)
are turned into policy-system outputs (goods and
actions) in unpredictable ways. Policy-system outputs
are intended to be conflict-system inputs. However,
conflict-system inputs are turned into conflict-system
outputs in unpredictable ways as well.
It gets even more complicated at the international
level. The U.S. policy system is embedded in a global
policy system in which every other participant has
their own complex policy system generating inputs
into any given conflict system. In systems and complexity theory, the U.S. policy system could be considered a subsystem of the international policy system, or
they could be considered two separate systems, and
both could technically be considered subsystems of an
international conflict system.
For the sake of technical analysis, one would need
to be very clear of what the boundaries of the various
interacting systems are. For the sake of simplicity in
this monograph, we use the “dual-system” framing
because we want to leave the reader with a mental
image of a mirror―the system for solving problems
is as complex as the problems being solved. In some
instances, the “complex policy system” used by U.S.
decisionmakers will include parts of the international
system, and in others it will not. The “complex conflict system” will include some international actors but
not others. A system modeler would insist on clarity of
the model’s boundaries. Here, we simply invite readers to envision how a conflict system might interact
with a policy system, and what elements are relevant
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to each of those systems on a case-by-case basis. In the
next two sections, we illustrate how failing to do so
makes it exceedingly difficult to succeed in complex
environments.
KNOWLEDGE, LESSONS, AND COMPLEX
CONFLICTS
When challenges related to decisionmaking and
effectiveness in complex conflicts are framed as being a
“dual-system problem,” it becomes possible to explain
not only unintended conflict outcomes but also unintended policy outcomes—such as why recommendations based on “lessons learned” keep being made but
not institutionalized.4 It is often the case that, when
experts carry out studies that make policy recommendations (or the experts make direct recommendations
as advisers), their recommendations and “lessons” end
up seeming to disappear into a black box—they are
either ignored entirely or the actions that result from
them end up not matching what was actually suggested. Frequently, a later study then discovers that
what had been recommended was not actually carried
out—but instead of figuring out why, that later study
simply reiterates how important the original recommendation was and makes the same recommendation
again. Nobody to our knowledge has ever studied the
policy system as a complex system to find the sources of
this resistance to institutionalizing “lessons learned.”5
That resistance is not due to maliciousness or incompetence in the federal workforce (civilian or military) but
rather to the nature of the system that has been set up
and revised by the U.S. Congress and Presidents from
both political parties over the course of many decades.
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Experts have been carrying out “lessons” research
for decades. In early 2003, for instance, the Association
of the U.S. Army in Arlington, VA, and the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, released the final report from their joint,
blue-ribbon Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR).6 The PCR Commission had spent most of
2002 extracting lessons from U.S. and international stabilization, reconstruction, and transition efforts over
the previous decade and distilling them into a framework intended to inform such efforts in the future. Its
report was released just 2 months before the United
States entered Iraq in March 2003.
Ten years later, the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released his final “lessons” report to the public.7 Lessons are intended to be
learned. When they are identified, published in a “lessons learned” report, or distilled into a “best practices”
guide, that report is supposed to be another way of
saying: “We did these things wrong last time. Let’s not
repeat those mistakes next time.” SIGIR’s report on lessons learned in Iraq from 2003 to 2013 contained seven
top-level lessons intended to communicate exactly
that: “We did these things wrong in Iraq. Let’s not
repeat them next time.” Yet six of SIGIR’s seven lessons (learned from a decade in Iraq) had also appeared
in the PCR Commission report a decade earlier—just
before the United States went into Iraq in the first place.
In 2015, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S.
Army War College (USAWC), published Chris Mason’s
monograph, Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam,
Iraq, and Afghanistan, identifying reasons for the failures in those and other conflicts—namely, that political
leaders who want to go to war will find a way even over
the objections and evidence of experts regarding the
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strategic impossibility of their leaders’ objectives.8 That
same year, the National Defense University published
Richard Hooker and Joseph Collins’ edited volume,
Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War, which
can be read as a plea for military leaders to learn that
same lesson and press harder against civilian leaders
who insist on starting or fighting unwinnable wars.9
The title of that volume was intended as a criticism:
lessons from wars are not often enough “learned” but
rather simply “encountered,” then ignored in practice.
So, mistakes keep getting repeated.
An unpublished review of lessons-learned studies, carried out in 2013 and 2014, identified 15 general
mistakes that have been repeated for decades.10 The
review covered lessons-learned studies across stages,
types, and locations of conflict as well as a wide range
of stabilization, reconstruction, political transition, and
peacekeeping efforts led by the United States and multilateral institutions, plus international development
efforts in a number of conflict and post-conflict environments. It included content from private research centers such as CSIS and the Stimson Center, Washington,
DC, U.S. Government entities such as the SIGIR and
SSI, presidential directives and national security strategies, military doctrine updates, high-level forums on
development, and multilateral institutions such as the
United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). The top-level lessons identified as common
themes in that review were as follows (related keywords are in parentheses):
1. Adapt as conditions change (improvise, experiment, entrepreneurial).
2. Coordinate planning (comprehensive, integrated, contingency).
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3. Coordinate policy domestically (whole-of-government, civil–military, interagency).
4. Coordinate with other donors (harmonization
of planning or implementation).
5. Decentralize implementation (on the ground,
exit strategy, long-term).
6. Demand results (oversight, accountability,
inspector general).
7. Develop the local private sector (jobs, trade,
investment).
8. Follow the host country’s lead (ownership, partnership, political will).
9. Foster self-sufficiency (sustainable, break
dependency).
10. Learn from experience (institutionalize success,
reward failure).
11. Make realistic promises (manage expectations).
12. Measure progress (data, evidence, theory of
change, monitoring and evaluation).
13. Protect communities (security first).
14. Respect local systems (alignment, inclusion).
15. Set feasible goals (absorptive capacity, start
small).
No doubt other researchers reviewing the same
studies would have categorized and characterized
the lessons differently. The general point of that informal study was to illustrate a disturbing consistency
in the production of high-level mistakes over many
decades. Many of the observations made in the international donor community’s Paris Declaration of 2005
would have sounded entirely familiar to readers of the
OECD’s development cooperation report in 1996. The
observations made in the Accra Agenda for Action in
2007 would have been familiar to readers of the World
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Bank’s Pearson Commission Report in 1969.11 Participants
in a 2014 conference on political transitions were challenged to guess what year the following quotes were
published:12
To raise hopes of a spectacular transformation may only
invite disillusionment and failure . . . Development is
necessarily a gradual process.13
No amount of aid, technical or financial, can replace
the essential will and determination . . . of the country
concerned.14
Strong vested interests often resist any changes which
would alter their position. . . . The problem of making
necessary adjustments in [a] traditional social relationship without destroying the stability essential for development is one which requires exceptional understanding
and leadership.15

Participants’ guesses ranged from the 1969 Pearson
report through the 2013 SIGIR report. In fact, they were
drawn from the World Bank’s fourth annual report
published in 1949, which contained a full two-thirds of
the 15 lessons listed above.16
To be fair, there have been real improvements over
the past decade and a half in, for example, civil-military cooperation, interagency coordination, and a
recognition of the importance of understanding local
politics and local systems. Civilian and military institutions have also contributed to important successes
(albeit mainly at the sector and community levels) that
have been a result of policy and operational learning.
It is important to acknowledge that these 15 themes
are not necessarily lessons that should be applied to
all contexts; nor are they the only lessons that need to
be learned, especially as conflicts continue to become
more complex. But the stability of these 15 top-level
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lessons over two-thirds of a century suggests there
are systemic impediments to effective policy in fragile
and conflict environments, and those impediments are
found not just in societies where complex conflicts are
taking place but in the institutions and societies that
respond to those conflicts from the outside as well.
In other words, the failure to learn and institutionalize lessons from experience is a symptom of the
dual-system problem. Policy systems are complex
systems, and some dynamic within such systems is
preventing the uptake of these lessons. The studies
themselves make recommendations that answer, in
effect, “What should we do the next time?” without
ever having addressed the question, “Why didn’t we
do it the last time?” The unacknowledged assumption
has always been that the target of the recommendation
is actually capable of doing what is recommended. It
turns out that that is simply not the case:
Most assessments in the development, peacebuilding, and
stabilization fields end with recommendations for what
the donor should do differently or what the donor should
require the recipient to do differently, without accounting
for whether the donor is capable of implementing
the recommendation. . . . This longstanding problem
suggests that the personnel within these institutions
who are “learning” these lessons are not the same people
who have authority to make key decisions about how
interventions are to be planned and implemented. Either
the knowledge is not being transferred from unit to unit
within these institutions, or different units have formal
processes, informal practices and attitudes, or various
incentives that push them away from designing and
implementing locally appropriate interventions.17

Policy recommendations are generally targeted to
decisionmakers, planners, and on-the-ground implementers. They tend to overlook both the constraints
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on those actors imposed by other functions within
their own organization required to carry out their
tasks, and the interrelationships between those critical but often ignored functions. The degree to which
a policy system is capable of turning inputs (recommendations and decisions) into intended outputs
(actions and resources) is sometimes called its “delivery capacity”—the:
knowledge, processes, cultural facts, or incentives [that]
affect the ability or willingness of [the organization’s]
personnel, budgeting, security, contracting, planning,
and leadership units to allow the intervention to be
designed and implemented in a way that is compatible
with local conditions.18

Research carried out in 2012 and 2013 found very
pointedly that shortcomings in implementation leading to program failures are at least as much a function
of donor capacity as they are a function of the complexity of the environments in which they are working.19
Explanations for failures of donor capacity are wide
ranging: incompetence and stubbornness of political
leaders, lack of knowledge about best practices, competing and perverse incentives at all levels, too little
money, too much money, too short rotations, and on
and on. In fact, the informal “lessons” review discussed
earlier identified 24 sets of hypotheses for why mistakes keep being repeated, categorized by knowledge,
culture, incentives, and processes across six organizational functions (personnel, budgeting, security, contracting, planning, and leadership).20 For example, it is
repeatedly recommended that field personnel should
interact with local populations so that they can understand the local context. This is truly essential, but the
recommendation misses an important point: in conflict
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environments, field personnel are often outright forbidden from doing so by the personnel security department of their own organization. The security team will
face consequences if someone is killed or kidnapped,
so they have an incentive to minimize that probability,
and if the success of the project in question depends
on personnel taking that risk, then the project will not
succeed. Similarly, the recommendation to let field
personnel be agile, flexible, and experimental is, of
course, a good one. But if the contract to do that work
was based on a proposal specifying precisely what the
contractor will and will not do, the field personnel will
be legally required to do those precise things, even if it
turns out the proposal’s assumptions had been wrong
or if local conditions changed. The contracting officer
might be willing to grant a waiver to give the contractor more flexibility on certain contract provisions, but
many contracting officers are hesitant to set precedents. They have the legal right to grant that waiver,
but no other contracting officer has done so in the past,
and that unit is, for whatever reason, culturally riskaverse, so the waiver will not be granted. Many other
hypotheses exist, and can be tested:
Do program managers, planners, contracting officers,
finance and accounting officials, and others take full
advantage of the flexibility they are legally permitted, or
do they tend to be risk-averse and unwelcoming toward
experimentation or requests for waivers? Are processes in
place for changing course quickly if a crisis arises during
implementation? . . . Do security rules punish personnel
security officials if something bad happens to field staff,
or do they have clear guidance giving them flexibility
to approve field-staff requests to operate in dangerous
areas? Do human resources processes and management
philosophies allow for the development of regional or
country expertise and offer rewards to personnel who
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take on high-risk or experimental projects? Or do certain
rotations or high-risk projects inhibit career advancement?
Do budgeting rules give field staff or implementers
flexibility in how much they can spend (e.g., are they
required to spend a minimum amount) or in how long
they can take to spend it (e.g., are they required to spend
it all during the fiscal year)?21

When there are so many hypotheses to explain a set
of outcomes, and when so many of them seem reasonable, then that is a fairly good indicator that a complex
system is at work. Most of these hypotheses have never
been tested systematically. They should be, and those
tests should be designed around the assumption that
the policy system is a complex system. Sources of policy
resistance can be identified and, ultimately, overcome.
No researcher carrying out a study of an operation to
identify “lessons learned” should stop once the lessons
are identified, especially if the lessons are any of the
15 themes identified earlier, or any lesson familiar to
people who work in complex environments. Instead,
their research and recommendations should focus on
why that known lesson had not been carried out in the
case under study in the first place, and should seek to
identify and recommend ways to overcome the source
of resistance to the practice in question. Otherwise,
the great stores of knowledge about what is and is not
effective in different environments will continue to get
lost in the complexity of our own policy systems.
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INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
AND COMPLEX CONFLICTS
As the last section argued, when people associated
with certain knowledge institutions fail to account for
the dual-system problem in the context of complex conflicts, mistakes are repeated and knowledge becomes
a weak tool for helping decisionmakers achieve their
objectives. Similarly, this section argues that when
people associated with certain supranational legal
institutions fail to account for the dual-system problem in the context of complex conflicts, international
law becomes a weak tool for helping decisionmakers
achieve their objectives, whether those objectives are
strategic or humanitarian. In both instances (knowledge and law), the problem is not that the institutions
in question are complex. The problem is that key personnel do not treat them as such, and as a consequence
they overlook key components and interrelationships
within those systems that have significant influence
over outcomes, and they fail to appreciate the time lags
produced by some of those unseen processes as they
work their way through the complex system. In the
case of knowledge, it is the back-office functions (and
their cultures, incentives, processes, and knowledge)
that are overlooked. In the case of law, it is extralegal
(or customary) norms that may be overlooked.
In this section, we illustrate the challenges of
deterring and prosecuting atrocities (large-scale, violent crimes) when key personnel fail to account for complexity in both the legal institutions and the conflicts
they are trying to manage, reconcile, or prosecute—
that is, when they fail to account for the dual-system
problem.
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A salient example is that over the last several years,
members of the international community have begun
to call for the indictment of major parties to the Syrian
conflict, who have either directly or because of superior responsibility contributed to the commission of
atrocities within Syria’s borders. Potential indictees are
alleged to include President Bashar al-Assad, several
leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
and a number of other heads of Syrian intelligence
agencies and detention facilities.22 Syria stands as an
exemplar of atrocity perpetration amidst complexity
in geopolitics and a highly-fractionalized war; almost
every international actor involved in the Syrian conflict
faces its own dual-system problem. Other examples
of atrocity perpetration in the midst of complex conflicts include acts alleged to have been committed in
Sudan (in particular Darfur, discussed in more depth
below), Uganda, Libya, and Yemen.23 Though varying
in prominence and international attention, all of these
conflicts have generated calls from international criminal lawyers for justice, accountability, and an end to
impunity for the orchestrators of mass violence.
International criminal law (ICL) is intended to be
an essential mechanism for accountability and deterrence; it forms a structural barrier to the commission
of protracted atrocity crimes.24 While the timeline of
its development is sometimes disputed, the historical starting point for ICL is often traced back to the
Nuremberg, Germany, and Tokyo, Japan, tribunals in
the aftermath of World War II, when criminal accountability, justice, and the rule of law were considered to
be foundational components of post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.25 Since then, and especially
over the last several decades, ICL has evolved rapidly
and significantly. From the establishment of the ad
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hoc tribunals for the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, to the hybrid tribunals for the crises in
Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and East Timor, the law has
progressed to provide modes of criminal liability for
the worst possible transgressions: war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide. These developments
culminated in the establishment of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002. The ICC’s “core” crimes
(genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
the crime of aggression) are enshrined in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (1998) and apply
to heads of state, military commanders, and other toplevel orchestrators of mass atrocities.26 In addition to
the work of the ICC, there remains the potential for
additional ad hoc tribunals run by the UN. As with the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia, such tribunals generally focus on
a specific country or conflict.27
As ICL has advanced from its origins in conventional warfare, conflicts themselves have evolved into
something far more complex, as chapter 2 points out.
The feasibility of ICL as a vehicle for deterring atrocity
crimes during complex emergencies and instances of
mass violence is therefore increasingly questioned.28 In
fact, there are a number of indicators that the presence
and exercise of ICL may actually harden the resolve
of actors working against international norms and
laws. Scholars and practitioners who fail to recognize
that the international legal system is a complex system
will have difficulty explaining and overcoming ICL’s
potential to generate maladaptive outputs, which then
risk feeding into complex conflict systems and exacerbating undesirable outcomes before top-level appointees even have time to implement workable changes.
The same systemic obstacles inhibiting the successful
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implementation of innovative and workable foreign
policy at the state level may also hinder the successful exercise of ICL as an effective legal or moral tool at
the international level. To an even greater degree than
domestic legal institutions, ICL as an international
institution bears the hallmarks of a complex system—it
absorbs inputs, exhibits feedback between interdependent elements (e.g., states, international courts, and
other international or multilateral actors), and generates outputs with long-term secondary consequences.29
It could be modeled as an independent system, as a
subsystem within another complex policy system, or
as a system that subsumes multiple policy systems,
depending on the needs of the systems analyst. The
choice of model boundaries, however, matters less for
present purposes than the recognition of its complexity. Treating it as a predictable legal institution makes
it a weak tool for protecting the innocent. Ignoring
key components of the complex conflicts to which it is
intended to be applied renders it even weaker.
ICL is not as predictable an institution as many
decisionmakers believe. Inputs or components of the
ICL system can include case-law precedents, theories
of criminal activity, the activities and legitimacy of
individual laws and courts (e.g., the ICC),30 and the
power, activities, and specific decisions of different
actors in the international community (e.g., United
Nations Security Council [UNSC] members). Outputs are equally varied and can include investigations and indictments, laws and rulings, or (as some
have argued) an overarching principle of deterrence
for would-be perpetrators of atrocity crimes. As with
all policy systems, ICL is an interconnected series of
decisions, behaviors, and processes with high levels of
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aggregation, large-scale impacts, significant self-regulation, and, at times, unintended consequences.
Unfortunately, ICL is not always treated as a complex system or subsystem within a broader complex
system but rather as something that is linear, structured, and deterministic. Decisionmakers involved in
ICL tend to respond to international crises in highly
predictable ways, which does not often translate effectively to liberal democracies at the domestic level,
let alone to highly unstructured, fractionalized, and
fragile contexts.31 The interconnectedness of ICL with
global power dynamics, and the conflation of ICL with
specifically Western and historic forms of law, have
made its outputs difficult to apply to complex conflict
systems. ICL has developed in reaction to conflicts
and crises, evolved over long swathes of time, and is
founded on expectations of certainty and consistency.
By its very nature, it is virtually impossible for ICL to
adapt with sufficient speed to either keep pace with
changing circumstances in complex situations or take
proactive approaches to fragile settings and mass violence. One expert we interviewed argued that the U.S.
policy system is simply not structured to operate in the
complex world we live in today, saying: “We are using
20th century solutions to 21st century problems.”32
This statement is equally true of ICL.
In fact, it is true of ICL, of the U.S. policy system,
of most policy systems embedded in large countries
today, and indeed in the international state system in
which all of them operate. These systems emerged from
the imaginations and negotiations of people living in
earlier times, facing different sets of constraints and
incentives, and shaped by different norms and goals.
Yet like other elements of global policy, ICL continues
to reflect the ideals and priorities of significant parts
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of the international community, even if the procedures
and ethos of international courts are usually overshadowed by the balance of global power and the ongoing
indemnity of international leaders. New laws, particularly international conventions and treaties, generally emerge after protracted negotiations between
states and international organizations. Equally, legal
precedent and legal literature may have persuasive
authority over the ways in which international policies
are enacted, particularly regarding humanitarian protections. Crimes of the nature under discussion here
may be seen as so reprehensible that they require no
less than an international focus.33 In other words, ICL
cannot be understood separately from broader political decisionmaking and incentives.
ICL also cannot be understood separately from
human rights norms. In a number of commentaries
relating to complex conflicts, scholars have linked the
need for ICL to mediate crises and conflicts with the
establishment and preservation of norms of behavior to which actors must conform (even during mass
violence), framing ICL as the final bulwark through
which norms of predictability, nonviolence, and
rationality must be re-established.34 Norms are generally defined in scholarship as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”35
By observing commonly understood norms, actors
take meaning from events, which affect their understandings of compliance; norms generate a sense of
“‘oughtness’ . . . [they are seen as] the appropriate thing
to do.”36 Even at the international level, norms are
not simply independent “rules” to be followed. State
actors are often influenced by international norms that
stipulate what is commonly accepted as appropriate or
inappropriate behavior.
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Norms may be treated as static, but they seldom are.
They came from somewhere, emerged through complex and dynamic interactions, are either reinforced
or challenged with every related action, and sometimes fall out of fashion, to be replaced by a new set of
norms. Some scholars have mapped this “norm lifecycle” as a process of emergence, diffusion, and cascade.
At the emergent stage, human rights norms are articulated by actors known as “norm entrepreneurs.”37
The characteristics of such actors are diverse in scope;
activist networks, multinational corporations, states
(or governments) themselves, and even particularly
influential individuals have all been classified as norm
entrepreneurs.38 Although their attributes may vary,
norm entrepreneurs are deemed critical in mobilizing
the international community to accept new modes of
behavior, which then come to be accepted as human
rights norms. The means by which norm entrepreneurs
encourage decisionmakers to put issues at the forefront of the national or international agenda vary, but
generally speaking, norm emergence occurs as a product of altruism, empathy, transnational mobilization
with other norm entrepreneurs, consensus building,
and historically favorable events that render formerly
non-compliant actors more amenable to conformity.39
If norm entrepreneurs have created an appropriately strong frame, the norm will resonate with a wide
audience (the phase characterized as “diffusion”) and
is therefore likely to be adopted. Once a number of
elites have been convinced of the need to support a
norm, the international community as a whole reaches
a tipping point.40 At this stage, it is not just the quantity of actors who choose to support the norm, but also
the relative power of those who support it that matters to its adoption. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn
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Sikkink describe this in terms of both raw power (i.e.,
the UNSC P5 members [China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States]) and moral
power (i.e., the newly transitioned South Africa in the
mid-1990s).41 As an increasing number of elite actors
adopt domestic principles in favor of a human rights
norm, others also become invested in promoting the
“appropriate” norms and the rules of “good” conduct—their emphasis on compliance is rooted in this
concern. The feedback between commonly understood
rules and action resulting from adherence to those
rules is known as the “logic of appropriateness.” A
government, for example, may understand the need to
demonstrate human rights compliance, but it might do
so without truly subsuming the norm into its own laws
and institutions. It is only at the point in which the
state actors change their discourse, engage in rule-consistent behavior, and adjust domestic laws accordingly
that the state is deemed to be truly “compliant.”42
Research has pointed to the critical role of international organizations (IOs) and international institutions (IIs) as both recipients and perpetuators of norm
diffusion. International institutions draw legitimacy
from their ability to address joint problems and generate benefits for states and societies. They provide
strength through joint membership and generate multilateral interdependence through exchanges of goods,
services, and capital between members. States may rely
on IOs to manage conflicts and mediate disputes; largescale IOs are also able to communicate their response
to norms through constructing discourse that indicates
support for specific human rights agendas.43 As norms
are often promoted through socialization processes
that involve punishment for detractors (which may
take such diverse forms as “naming and shaming,”
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sanctions, legal action, etc.) and legitimation of compliance, IIs become the ideal mechanisms through which
such processes occur. Therefore, they are critical at the
diffusion and emergence stages of the norm lifecycle.
Association with an international court is a particularly
apt example of such compliance-through-membership. The possibility of an investigation by an external,
ostensibly independent organization, and the possible political repercussions resulting from violations of
international law, theoretically serve as a particularly
strong disincentive to the commission of human rights
violations. For this reason, scholars point to deterrence
as a means by which international courts provide a
serious threat of investigation, enforcement, and punishment for would-be norm violators.44
Research also suggests that compliant actors
encourage adherence to international norms in order
to integrate with allies and to avoid being perceived as
“deviant” actors.45 For ICL, this allows courts, states,
and the international community as a whole to construct networks based on “inclusion” and “exclusion”
between “violators” and “compliers.”46 Networks exist
within any group that “facilitates collective action and
cooperation, exercises influence or serves as a means
of international governance.”47 Conformity within
groups is regulated through a combination of domestic and international pressures, the shaming of human
rights violators, and clarifications of acceptable behavior. Ideally, the process of norm entrenchment ultimately becomes mutually enforcing, to the extent that
actors are no longer aware of the norm itself or conscious of their ongoing conformity.48 As the field of ICL
has developed, and as precedent has been established
for the management of atrocity crimes, even formerly
non-compliant states have arguably been motivated
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to adopt domestic laws aligning with an international
legal standard. In doing so, they are able to maintain
the primacy of their legal systems whilst simultaneously proving compliance with human rights norms.49
Sikkink’s analysis of the “justice cascade” perfectly
illustrates this process: the movements toward an
international standard of accountability for atrocity
crimes by Heads of State and military leaders allowed
for the establishment of “a decentralized but interrelated system of accountability for violations.”50
Norm cascades (as with the justice cascade specifically) are fully realized when a critical mass of states
(both compliant and formerly-deviant) has adopted a
norm. Without fully understanding this process and
without pinpointing the various factors of pressure,
catalytic events, dialogue, and negotiation, it is virtually impossible to understand what conditions may be
necessary to ensure the survival of a norm.51 Norms
may be time-contingent or predicated on a set of conditions that has since changed. If the necessary and
sufficient conditions required for the operation of a
norm are not effectively understood, it is impossible to
predict the extent to which its utility may be sustained
over time.
Evidence is mixed as to whether ICL serves as a
realistic threat to actors or groups who are not susceptible to the interactions of international law and
norms. Some researchers have argued that the International Criminal Court and the presence of international human rights law are specific deterrents, while
other scholars argue that many repressive autocracies are largely immune to ICL processes.52 There is a
fundamental incompatibility between actors who are
committing atrocity crimes in a complex, violent, and
unpredictable setting on the one hand and consistent,
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functioning, peacetime norms of behavior on the other.
Groups operating in complex conflicts are thus able to
continue to operate while still putting themselves in
diametric opposition to world norms, regardless of
their power status or overall embeddedness in a global
political system.53
As demonstrated by the simulation discussed in
chapter 3, real-world actors who are spoilers to peacebuilding endeavors, who commit the worst crimes, and
who are most disruptive to the conflict do not often
feel a need to operate in a way that is morally bound
or even consistent. In contrast, the morality and order
embedded in ICL practically requires that the international community and international legal responses to
atrocities be consistent, even if that consistency leads
to inaction, intractability, or mission failure. Those parties perpetrating atrocity crimes in complex conflicts
are highly adaptive and prone to shifting behaviors,
alliances, and power structures with both domestic
and international actors, and they are largely impervious to deterrence. In contrast, the ICL system is
internally and externally consistent, resistant to quick
adaptation, and relies on embedded expectations of
“good” and “bad” actors who either understand and
promulgate normative behavior (in the case of the
former) or reject it completely (in the case of the latter).
Its character renders it ill equipped to prevent, counteract, or manage effectively complex conflicts when
they occur or to encourage or promote innovations to
make it more effective. Those who believe that ICL can
effectively change the mandate of actors in complex
conflicts are applying a highly-structured solution to
an unstructured problem; such solutions are virtually
destined to fail.
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Having said that, there is evidence that norms are
being generated by actors engaged in protracted conflict; they may simply be the “wrong” kinds of norms:
“in the state of war or authoritarianism, abuse can
become both normal and/or state-sanctioned.”54 As
a result, understanding deterrence and the diffusion
of potentially amoral norms requires more nuance.
While high-level commanders of rebel organizations
and leaders of authoritarian states may appear to
lie beyond the reach of ICL, they are not beyond the
reach of normative influence at all—they still have a
need for alliances and resources.55 While indictments
are unlikely to deter their behavior, and groups may
see international legal classifications of their actions
as irrelevant to their cause and motives, they are not
beyond opprobrium or influence. Rather than relying too heavily upon the normative power of ICL and
ignoring the mixed results of deterrence theories, scholars and practitioners should instead analyze the way
these groups generate their own norms and modes of
behavior, assessing whether it is the morality (or lack
thereof) of rogue actors that allows them to function in
a way that is highly adaptable, or some other facet of
their networking and norm development.56
Another salient example of the way competing
norms work in practice and weaken the effectiveness
of ICL is the ongoing situation in Darfur, Sudan.57 In
March 2005, the UNSC referred the situation in Darfur
to the ICC; following investigations, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the Court issued two warrants of arrest against
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide committed
from March 2003 to (at least) July 2008.58 Articles 86 and
89 of the 1998 Rome Statute dictate that any ratifying
state is bound to cooperate with the ICC by arresting
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and surrendering to the Court an accused person who
enters that state’s territory. Al-Bashir has traveled to
a number of ratifying states since the issuance of the
warrants against him, but to date those warrants have
yet to be executed and proceedings against al-Bashir
remain stagnant.59
Each time al-Bashir is found to have entered the
territory of a ratifying state, the Court holds a hearing
to determine the non-compliance of the state involved.
In the 8 years since the arrest warrants were issued,
Chad,60 Kenya,61 Djibouti,62 Malawi,63 Democratic
Republic of Congo,64 Uganda,65 South Africa,66 and
most recently Jordan67 have been found non-compliant
with their 1998 Rome Statute obligations for failing to
hand over Omar al-Bashir to the Court. Though these
states have used a number of legal arguments to rationalize non-compliance, the predominant defense for
non-compliance has been ratione personae (personal
immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign states), historically granted to Heads of State during the course
of their period in office.68 Such immunity forms a
long-standing cornerstone of customary international
law; protection from foreign interference goes to the
heart of state sovereignty, placing power in the hands
of governments to punish their own people for any
crimes committed in office.69 Al-Bashir has capitalized on these principles; he has used his outstanding
arrest warrants as leverage to espouse anti-Court (and
pro-state sovereignty) sentiments, accused the ICC
of politically-motivated prosecutions, and called for
pan-African solidarity against the Court.70 There is evidence that this tactic is succeeding.71
In spite of persistent findings by the Court that ratifying states’ treaty obligations outweigh custom, states
are nevertheless continuing to engage in behavior that
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contravenes these rulings. There is thus little evidence
that the Court’s opprobrium is having any effect on
future behavior. The norm of compliance with the
Rome Statute is not hardening, and new means of
securing state conformity are not being used. Far from
strengthening the anti-impunity norm for Heads of
State, it appears that the Court’s rulings may be both
generating and bolstering an increasingly effective
rhetoric against its work and effectiveness—a perverse
consequence typical of complex policy systems and
compelling evidence for the existence of an unresolved
dual-system problem.
The standard response in the face of such frustrating intractability is what Paula Kivimaa and Florian
Kern call “policy layering” or the process of adding
new goals and instruments on top of existing ones.72
The authors argue that using layering techniques
allows policymakers to accumulate new policies without systematically analyzing the shortcomings embedded in the old ones, thus inoculating organizations
and bureaucracies from having to acknowledge their
failures. Similar critiques may be made of ICL, as the
common approach is to add to an existing repertoire of
laws and treaties rather than to streamline them; such
a process of evolution takes a significant amount of
time, at times lagging behind ever-varying global realities. Layering also negates the need to assess ICL processes systematically as a whole. Historical analyses
suggest that, due to its recent and rapid proliferation,
the bulk of ICL evolved through jurisprudence at the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the
Former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. All of these tribunals were post-hoc endeavors, and there is insufficient evidence that ICL has
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been successful as a proactive tool against would-be
criminals.73
The relationship between the U.S. policy system
and ICL is multifaceted and has varied over time. The
United States played a critical role in the Nuremberg
(Germany) Military Tribunal, contributing significant
resources and legal personnel, including famed Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson. U.S. jurists also played key
roles in ad hoc and hybrid tribunals throughout the
1990s and early 2000s. However, in the aftermath of
the 1998 Rome Conference, the United States rapidly
became one of the biggest detractors to the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Having
signed the Rome Statute in December 2002, the United
States declared almost immediately afterwards that
it did not intend to ratify the treaty.74 By doing so, it
freed itself from an obligation to act in accordance with
the object and principles of the Rome Statute, per Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Such “unsignings” have been viewed as damaging
to the ICC’s legal power and legitimacy.75 Indeed, the
U.S. approach to international treaties as a whole has
been inconsistent at best—including refusals to accept
the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS),
a failure to sign the 1990 Convention on the Rights of
the Child, and withdrawals from international agreements on climate change.76 Such behavior has been
described as “anachronistic in an era of globalization
and interdependence.”77 Although the United States
is far from the only state to refuse to subscribe to ICL
instruments, U.S. engagement with contemporary
conflicts, coupled with its exceptionalism in the face
of international rules, hinders ICL as a tool for managing complex conflicts. The effect of this is clear: if powerful actors do not appear to be bound by norms of
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behavior, this then weakens the efficacy of the norms
themselves in diffusing appropriate behavior for other
actors, including nonstate actors.78 U.S. exceptionalism
also creates an environment in which international
actors (including members of the military) may act in
accordance with their own domestic rules, laws, and
preferences, but may not in all circumstances consider
themselves directly bound by international legal provisions relating to the laws of war.79 Whether the U.S.
plays a proxy role in a conflict or is directly involved in
a military engagement, such an approach risks undermining the norms and efficacy of the ICL system.
How norms diffuse and are used by actors in complex conflict systems, how global politics and geopolitical demands affect the ICL system (and its relationship
to complex conflicts), and how the international community interprets the appropriate role of ICL and layers
new approaches on top of existing ones all affect the
degree to which international law does or (more commonly) does not deter atrocity crimes or punish their
perpetrators. As with institutions for generating and
promulgating knowledge, complex legal institutions
have unseen components that have unknown effects
and interact in counterintuitive ways. Even in the face
of indictments for top-tier perpetrators, there is room
to question whether ICL can ever become a proactive
mitigator of conflicts if its main proponents so rarely
acknowledge—much less understand or model—its
undeniable complexity.80

73

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. There are precedents to treating policy institutions as systems. See, for example, John D. Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2002.
2. We use the term “institutions” in the sense understood by
social scientists, as systems of rules and relationships, rather than
the more common usage that is more or less synonymous with
“organizations.”
Without doing much violence to the relevant literature,
we may define institutions as systems of established and
prevalent social rules that structure social interactions.
Language, money, law, systems of weights and measures,
table manners, and firms, and other organizations are thus
all institutions [italics in original].
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CHAPTER 5. POLICY RESISTANCE AND THE
SYSTEMIC MINDSET
Chapter 4 focused on two significant subsystems
of complex policy systems regularly foiled in their
attempts to achieve important policy objectives. International criminal law, embedded in a complex global
policy system, is intended to deter and prosecute
atrocity crimes. However, because it has so little effect
on power relations within the broader policy system,
its effectiveness is often highly constrained—counterbalanced or overpowered by negative feedback
dynamics. Knowledge institutions, also embedded in
complex policy systems, are intended to help policymakers learn how to become more effective over time.
Ironically, however, because those institutions have so
little influence over the policies, cultures, and incentives of other key components within their own policy
system (and in fact, rarely even account for them in
their research), their effectiveness at improving policy
effectiveness is often highly constrained—also counterbalanced and overpowered by negative feedback
dynamics.
These are clear examples of policy resistance, a
phenomenon most policymakers have experienced
but few have ever studied explicitly. A classic case
in domestic policy illustrates the concept. In the late
1960s, schools in Boston were becoming increasingly
segregated, with white students making up a third
of the population of mixed-race schools in 1968 and
less than a quarter by 1973. In 1974, the city enacted
a policy to send students by bus, if needed, to different schools in order to maintain more balanced ratios
of races. That policy resulted in an immediate increase
of white enrollment at mixed-race schools to about a
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third in 1974 and as high as 40 percent in 1975. Then
white families unhappy with the busing policy started
moving to the suburbs. By 1982, not only had the percentage of white students returned to the pre-busing
level, but the decline of the white-student population
in mixed-race schools had also returned to its previous trajectory, eventually dropping below 20 percent
by 1991. A Department of Energy tutorial on system
dynamics published that year neatly summarized this
classic example of policy resistance:
Policy resistance occurs when a policy is applied to
a system dominated by negative feedback processes
and the policy change does not alter the desired states
of the negative loops. In the case of the percentage of
white students attending Boston schools with nonwhite
students, the busing policy did not change the desire
of white parents to have their children attend school
primarily with other white students. . . . Thus, after busing
was instituted, many white families gradually moved
to the suburbs and enrolled their children in primarily
white schools.1

There are generally two ways the term “policy
resistance” is used. The classic archetype of policy
resistance in the system dynamics literature is actually characterized by positive (or reinforcing) feedback rather than the negative feedback of the example
above. In positive feedback, an increase in some problem puts pressure on decision-makers to implement a
solution, which ameliorates the problem in the short
term but has unintended consequences that, after a
delay, ends up making the problem worse in the long
term—which puts pressure on decision-makers to double-down on the solution, repeating the vicious cycle.2
Outside of system dynamics, policy resistance can
have a looser definition, at times more akin to policy
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stasis or constraints to policy uptake. In dynamic
terms, policy stasis takes place in systems with negative (or balancing) feedback. The appearance of a problem or an increase in the problem puts pressure on
decision-makers to implement a solution. However,
countervailing pressures in the system (negative
feedback) either prevent the policy from being implemented, prevent the solution from ameliorating the
problem, or build up after a short-term improvement
then neutralize the solution after a delay—all of which,
in the end, result in the problem’s returning to its previous level or trajectory.
A complex problem-solving system cannot solve
a complex problem unless the problem solvers themselves have a high-level understanding of both systems. In cybernetics, the field that studies command
and control in systems, the term “variety” is used to
describe how complex a system is known to be (i.e.,
a measure of all possible system outcomes). The First
Law of Cybernetics—also called Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety—stipulates that a system with a low
level of variety cannot “regulate” a system with a
higher level of variety: only “variety can destroy variety.”3 In other words, if you cannot imagine (or model)
how complex a problem is, you cannot come up with
solutions that account for unforeseen possibilities. If
decision-makers do not know how complex their own
policy system is, they will not be able to imagine all the
ways their decisions could be implemented by their
own system—including the unintended consequences
of their decisions. The decision-maker has a lower variety than the policy system and therefore cannot control how decisions are implemented. In turn, because
the policy system’s full complexity remains unstudied, it has a lower variety than the conflict system
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and therefore cannot hope to succeed in such complex environments except by chance. Dr. Lamb, one
of the authors, has made a similar observation using
a framework designed to study the problem-solving
capabilities of systems at six levels of sophistication:
problem-solving systems at one level can only solve
problems at or below that level. What that research
shows is not merely that some problems are harder to
solve than others:
but rather that some problems are fundamentally unsolvable
by lower-level problem-solving systems. . . . It’s hard
enough when the problem system and the problem-solving
system are at the same level. This research shows that the
dual-system problem is fundamentally insurmountable for
higher-level problems [italics in original].4

To deal with the growing complexity of the challenges we face as a society, the U.S. policy system needs
to become a better (higher-level) problem-solving
system. The remainder of this chapter focuses on what
might be required to accomplish such an upgrade, recommending first steps toward becoming more entrepreneurial, more experimental, and more systemic.
BECOMING MORE ENTREPRENEURIAL
To be entrepreneurial is to “undertake” a significant venture or activity of some sort,5 so the adjective
has come to be associated with all the various character
traits that involve creating something. This includes a
thirst for adventure; enthusiasm for challenges; willingness to take risks; ability to be flexible; and a tendency to be innovative, creative, motivated, persuasive,
resilient, agile, patient, trustworthy, and passionate.6
Most commonly, it is understood that entrepreneurs
are opportunistic. Peter Drucker suggested, “[T]he
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entrepreneur always searches for change, responds
to it, and exploits it as an opportunity.”7 Howard Stevenson coined probably the most famous definition of
entrepreneurship as “the pursuit of opportunity without regard to resources currently controlled”8 and contrasted an entrepreneurial mindset with a managerial
or administrative mindset:
In making decisions, administrators and entrepreneurs
often proceed with a very different order of questions.
The typical administrator asks: What resources do I
control? What structure determines our organization’s
relationship to its market? How can I minimize the impact
of others on my ability to perform? What opportunity is
appropriate? The entrepreneur, at the other end of the
spectrum, tends to ask: Where is the opportunity? How
do I capitalize on it? What resources do I need? How do I
gain control over them? What structure is best?9

Entrepreneurs—whether building for-profit businesses, non-profit organizations (“social entrepreneurs”), or innovative services inside government
agencies or corporate departments (“intrapreneurs”)—
are people who know their constituents; take risks; find
whatever resources they need; accept failure, adapt,
and try again; and the most successful ones never let
themselves be fooled by their own public relations.
By contrast, in institutions where failure is punished,
people tend to become risk-averse and feel pressure
to frame results optimistically. Those who are more
comfortable with risk and ambiguity, however, can
become real sources of innovation even within well-established institutions.
Before discussing what it means for a government
and its personnel to become more entrepreneurial, it is
useful to clarify what it does not mean. A government
is responsible for achieving significantly more than
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simply making a profit for shareholders. It is responsible for the survival of a whole society. Inefficiencies
are built into the system on purpose. In The Federalist
Papers No. 51, James Madison argued, “ambition must
be made to counteract ambition” so that power-hungry individuals would have difficulty concentrating
power. Checks and balances were put in place in the
U.S. Constitution as a way to be sure the broadest
interests were accounted for and ambition could be
channeled into a source of stability.10
Because the government is responsible for the society’s long-term survival and because there are many
factors influencing a society’s survival, a government is required to accomplish a very wide range of
objectives at the same time—defense, prosperity, justice, stability, etc.—and some objectives can be mutually contradictory (security vs. freedom, stability vs.
growth, etc.).11 In business, there are always tradeoffs
to be made when trying to maximize long-term cash
flow, but in government, there are exponentially more
tradeoffs simply because there are so many more
objectives. Domestic policy again provides a useful
illustration, in this case an illustration of the government’s simultaneous objectives of helping the needy,
minimizing fraud, rewarding productive labor, and
avoiding racial discrimination.
This combination of financial help and the occasional
verbal kick in the pants is something close to what the
ideal of government help used to be. Social workers used
to make individual judgments about what sort of help
their clients needed or deserved. But such judgments
always have an inherently subjective and arbitrary
quality, which courts began to frown on in the middle of
the 20th century, in part because they offered considerable
discretion for racial discrimination. Turning government
welfare into an automatic entitlement based on simple
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rules undoubtedly made it fairer, and kept people from
slipping through the cracks. But making it harder to
remove benefits from people who stopped trying also
made it easier for people to make understandable shortterm decisions which turned into long-term dependence,
leaving a significant number of people disconnected from
work and mired in multi-generational poverty.12

The difficulty of balancing multiple objectives
comes into play when dealing with complex conflict
situations all the time. Take contracting as an example.
In business, contracting should be a straightforward
matter of two parties negotiating terms and coming to
an agreement about a business relationship, including
how money can and must be spent and for what it is
given in exchange. But that contract depends on being
in a society with enough social capital that parties to
contracts can be trusted to negotiate more or less in
good faith, and on the rule of law fostered and enforced
by governments so that, when contract violations do
occur, there is a predictable system in place through
which the parties can argue their case, expect a neutral outcome, and be assured that the outcome will be
enforced. The government is the neutral third party.
Government contracting is different for precisely that
reason: it has the potential for one of the parties to the
contract to be the enforcer. It therefore requires extra
provisions to protect against corruption—either a
government taking advantage of its privileged status
as both party and enforcer, or a government worker
engaging in bribery or nepotism.
To make government contracting more efficient
and flexible—to, for example, enable program managers to be more entrepreneurial in the field—requires
a prior understanding of the purpose any particular
inefficiency is serving. What would happen if you
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broadened waiver authority or removed certain extra
steps that are in place to protect against nepotism or
kickbacks? It would make some contracts more flexible,
but it would also risk more corruption, and the corruption would lead to a situation in which contracts are
awarded based more on who is in a position to make
money than on who is capable of doing the best work.
This is what policy resistance in a complex system looks
like: a policy intended to make contracting more efficient so that programming that can be more effective
is put into place. As people within the system adapt to
the new policy (e.g., by not trusting enforcement, or by
engaging in secret side deals), the result ends up being
that programming is now less effective. The simple—in
fact, simplistic—solution to contracting inefficiencies
that is often proposed is to reduce the regulatory load
so it operates more like business contracting; but as
noted, that risks perverse consequences. The complexity-aware solution would be to produce a number of
hypotheses about how contracting can be made more
efficient; then, understanding all the competing objectives and the dynamics of what affects and is affected
by the contracting system, to work through how each
scenario might lead to the desired outcome. System
dynamics modeling, grounded theory, political economy analysis, human-centered design, and complexity-aware process tracing all could be useful approaches
to undertaking such an analysis (see “Becoming More
Systemic” in this chapter).
To take another example relevant to complex conflicts, security personnel make determinations about
whether field staff can go out in the field to meet locals
under certain circumstances. A private citizen can book
a commercial flight to, say, Afghanistan or Somaliland and stay in a private hotel or guest house; doing
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business might require a couple of additional approvals—but that is nothing compared to the approvals
needed by a government employee or private-sector
staff working on a government contract. As a civilian
staff on conflict-related issues, there are many layers
of approvals needed to get there physically, and the
result is that many people who should be interacting
with locals and learning the local environment are not
able to do so. Effectiveness suffers as a result.
Clearly, there needs to be more risk-taking and
more flexibility—the way businesses are able to operate in such environments. However, again, businesses
are not governments; if staff are kidnapped or killed,
the business can pull out of the country, with the
main consequence being lost profit, or a few owners
and possibly some employees or executives having to
answer to the board. However, if a government has to
pull out of a country, the consequences can range from
no real effect at all to an outbreak of a viral epidemic or
a resumption of war. If some of the layers of approvals are removed in the name of efficiency, or if some
of the approvers are encouraged to approve waivers
more easily, there are potential political ramifications
at home if someone is killed or kidnapped, and the
country has to pull out additional personnel as well
(see, for example, the domestic politics over Benghazi,
Libya). The political responses to those consequences
in the past are what led to today’s regulations in the
first place—and they made programming less effective, and therefore potentially more dangerous, and
therefore less likely to permit flexibility, and so on,
feeding into the vicious cycle.
These are the sorts of problems policymakers have
to contend with in complex policy systems. It can
never be as simple as “running governments more
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like businesses” because businesses and governments
are simply different things. A policy system is always
going to be more complex than even the largest and
most diversified multinational corporation. In fact,
because governments are governments and not businesses, any attempt to treat a government like a business—by, for example, reducing regulations without
attention to their second-order effects or by ignoring
certain constituencies—is likely to have second- and
third-order effects that neutralize any gains from
the naive pseudo-privatization strategy. A strategy
of dominance—for example, by political appointees
attempting to sideline the bureaucracy—is likely to
backfire for the same reasons.
There are, however, some practices and some
mindsets that governments can constructively adopt
from the business world that explicitly recognize the
complex nature of the policy system. Some approaches
to managing businesses and developing business
strategies take as a starting point the observation that,
because the factors contributing to business success
exist in dynamic relationships, dynamic methods can
be used in strategy and management:
[The] strategy dynamics method for developing and
implementing strategy … is made possible by deploying
the rigorous, scientific method of system dynamics—
well-established since the 1960s—to the task of strategic
management. In essence, system dynamics is the
application of engineering control theory principles to
social systems, and since all enterprises are “designed”
systems, those principles are directly applicable to their
design and management.13

Such approaches could in principle be applied to analyzing the complex dynamics limiting the ability of the
policy system to become more entrepreneurial, making
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it possible to simulate different policy and institutional
reforms to see which have the fewest unintended perverse consequences.
In addition to applying sophisticated business management and strategy tools to policy management and
reform, probably the most promising way to discover
how the government could become more entrepreneurial is simply by experimenting with approaches to
incorporating innovation (see the next section for more
on experimentation). There are some good examples
taking place already. The United States Institute of
Peace incubated the PeaceTech Lab to accelerate the
development of technologies useful in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The State Department started
a Strategy Lab to identify innovative approaches to foreign policy challenges and opened an office in Silicon
Valley to build technology and innovation relationships with the private sector. The Defense Department
opened Defense Innovation Unit-Experimental (DIUx)
offices in San Francisco and Boston to find ways to
improve its access to new commercial technologies.
The Department of Homeland Security opened an
office in Silicon Valley for similar reasons. The Government Accountability Office established an internal
consultancy called 18F to offer agile development services to other agencies.14 The White House established
the U.S. Digital Service to improve the quality and
speed of technology development. Most recently, the
Office of American Innovation (which encourages private-sector levels of efficiency) and the U.S. Agency for
International Development’s U.S. Global Development
Lab funds innovative approaches to fighting extreme
poverty through its Development Innovation Ventures
program, and its Feed the Future initiative has established innovation laboratories at several universities
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to accelerate applied research on food security.15 The
U.S. Army has also implemented reforms intended to
make it more agile in response to the growing complexity of today’s operating environment, including
an agile acquisition process introduced in 2011 and a
major reorganization into a modular force structure
some years earlier.16
Some of these initiatives are not without criticism.
Several interviewees who wish to remain anonymous
suggested that some offices seem to have adopted the
language of innovation while, in fact, continuing to
run conventional programs.17 However, most at least
have begun processes that are necessary and important
first steps toward bypassing the sources of resistance
to innovation within the overall policy system. They
are worth keeping in place and perhaps expanding for
at least several more years to give them a chance to
either live up to their potential or demonstrate failure
and try something else. It would be particularly helpful to offer more opportunities for rotations in those
offices by career civil servants and military officers and
to reward them for participating in those rotations so
that an entrepreneurial mindset can be more widely
incubated.
Finally, it should not be overlooked that, despite
the shortcomings of the U.S. policy system when it
comes to decision making on complex matters, Western forms of government such as the American system
historically have been engines of innovation precisely
because of how they are structured. As Karl Deutsch
has argued, three of the most important “techniques
for accelerating innovation” that Western governments
have developed are “majority rule, the protection of
minorities, and the institutionalization of dissent”:
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Majority rule in the Western manner permits . . . a change
to be carried out much earlier and thus much faster [than
systems requiring unanimity]. At the same time, Western
traditions for the protection of minorities may prevent
majority-imposed rates of change from disrupting the
integrity and dignity of dissenting individuals and groups,
or of breaking the bonds and communication channels
of social cohesion. Finally, the institutionalization of
dissent, and the provision of acceptable channels and
modes for the expression of criticism and self-criticism,
of counterproposals, and of new suggestions, protect
not merely the majority of yesterday but also provide
potential growing points for the majorities of tomorrow.
Taken together, majority rule, minority protection, and
institutionalized dissent . . . provide Western societies
and political systems with an unusually wide range of
resources and instrumentalities for rapid social learning
and innovation.18

In other words, any approach to encouraging
entrepreneurial innovation that has the effect of undermining majority rule, minority protection, or institutionalized dissent will not lead to more innovation, but
instead, to the suppression of innovation, not just in
policymaking, but also throughout society as a whole.
Such approaches are to be avoided.
BECOMING MORE EXPERIMENTAL
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, prominent social
psychologist and research methodologist Donald
Campbell, reflecting on his many years of work on
policymaking and program evaluation, concluded that
many policy recommendations fail to account for the
realities of the political systems through which they
are intended to be implemented:
On the one hand, as we try to implement high-quality
program evaluations, we meet with continual frustration
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from the political system. It seems at times set up just
so as to prevent social reality-testing. . . . On the other
hand, if we look to our own recommendations to
government regarding how to implement programs so
that their impact can be evaluated, one can see that we
evaluation methodologists are, in fact, often proposing
novel procedures for political decisionmaking. We are, in
fact, designing alternative political systems. If we were
self-consciously aware of this, we would, I believe, often
make different recommendations.19

In Campbell’s view, a society that wanted to solve
hard problems would design its institutions around
experimentation and learning and would design programs for implementing policies as experiments. Planners and program managers would treat policies not
as answers to the problems they are intended to solve
but as questions: will this particular policy, and this
particular plan for implementing it, actually work in
this particular circumstance?
Unfortunately, no society has ever designed itself
as an “experimenting society,” and it is likely that none
ever will. Human and organizational psychology and
social and political dynamics work to push against
the development of the levels of social trust, collective
action, skepticism, empathy, and learning required.
Learning is still possible, and a society’s institutions
can still do a lot to become more experimental.
All policies are hypotheses. All plans are experiments. All programs have impact. However, policymakers think they are proposing answers, when they
should be posing questions. Planners think they are
drawing roadmaps, when they should be designing
laboratories. Program evaluators think they are seeing
whether the question was answered, when they should
be discovering what questions were never asked in
the first place (e.g., did the program have unintended
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effects we did not think to measure?). Two common
quotes in military circles—“Plans are worthless, but
planning is everything”20 and “No plan survives first
contact with the enemy”21—suggest these observations
are intuitively understood by many. Treating policies
as experiments need not be treated figuratively, however—they should be taken literally. Ideas and plans
should be treated as testable hypotheses and opportunities to learn—using and generating the best information possible, questioning assumptions, identifying
hidden assumptions, being willing to learn from failures, and rejecting half-truths, biased evidence, and
intellectual dishonesty. At minimum, a willingness to
be honest about what is and is not known and to follow
the facts wherever they lead is essential. As one expert
told us, “Everything we do should be evidence-based
or evidence-producing.”22 Actual experiments are
not always possible in complex conflicts, but natural
experiments and opportunities to explore dynamics
are abundant and should be encouraged. Policies can
at least be designed as if they were scientific experiments so data can be collected systematically.
Science is systematic curiosity. If policymakers and
planners were given freedom, training, and incentives
to be more scientific, they would be more systematic
(defining hypotheses, ranges of outcomes, variables,
observation methods, thresholds of success, etc.) and
curious (more interested in discovering whether a particular approach can work in certain contexts than in
naively implementing it). Programs would be designed
and managed around the need to make field observations and collect data systematically.
Governments already sponsor research using the
full range of research methods, such as randomized
controlled experiments, case studies, and natural
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experiments as well as highly technical methods requiring advanced mathematics, computing power, and
data visualization. The Army and other military services already engage in sophisticated simulations or
war games, many of which are excellent examples of
using experimental methods to make important discoveries about the circumstances under which certain
objectives can and cannot be achieved. The Army’s
Force XXI initiative of the 1990s was also a good example of using experimental methods to test different
force structures to discover the structures best aligned
with the operating environment, in this case ultimately
resulting in the modular structure the Army adopted
in the 2000s. The Army Operating Concept of 2014
places experimentation at the center of the kind of
thinking required to learn about the complex operating environment of the future (focusing on 2020-2040):
“Army leaders develop and mature concepts for future
armed conflict, assess concepts in experimentation and
other learning activities, and use what is learned to
drive future force development.”23 These efforts make
essential contributions to the knowledge institutions
that make policy learning possible and, in some cases,
make it possible to identify organizational barriers to
learning and adaptation.
What we mean by becoming more experimental
is to apply that same degree of scientific and military
rigor to policy design and implementation, not just to
knowledge production.
Consider a similar dynamic in the private sector.
In a for-profit business, decisions are made by management and implemented by staff, who produce an
output—a product or service—that results in revenue
for the company. Product design is essential, because
what is being sold needs to meet an important need
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of people with the money to buy it. Business model
design is essential as well, because how the product is
made will determine how well it meets the customer’s
needs, and how the product is brought to market will
determine how much revenue is ultimately absorbed.
Linear design models can fail in rapidly changing
environments. For example, one author describes how
investors in the Iridium satellite phone company lost
almost all of their original $5 billion investment in 2000
because its:
business plan had assumptions about potential customers,
their problems, and the product needed to solve that
problem . . . predicated on the state of the mobile phone
industry in 1990. . . . [Iridium then] went into an 8-year
Waterfall engineering development process. Waterfall
development is a sequential way to develop a product
(requirements, design, implementation, verification—
ship). Waterfall makes lots of sense in a market [where]
the customer problem is known, and all customer needs
and product features can be specified up front. It is
death in a rapidly changing business. [In] the 11 years
it took Iridium to go from concept to launch, innovation
in mobile phones and cell phone networks moved at
blinding speed. By the time Iridium launched, there were
far fewer places on the planet where cell phone service
was unavailable.24

This anecdote will likely sound familiar to any federal government contractors working on international
development projects in fragile and conflict environments. The requirements are stated, a request for
proposals is issued, a proposal is selected, and the contractor is expected to execute the contract as written. In
some cases, a degree of flexibility is built into the contract. But if the assumptions written into the proposal
turn out to be wrong, or if the situation on the ground
changes in a way not anticipated in the contract, then
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the project might well continue to be implemented
regardless—to the detriment of the original policy
objective and often the very people the project was
supposed to help.
Some private-sector investors, having learned this
lesson the hard way, experimented (often without
realizing they were running experiments) with new
approaches to designing new products and business
models (see “Expert Engagement” in chapter 3). Perhaps the most famous articulation of the new approach
was the “lean startup” method of Eric Ries, based partly
on Steve Blank’s “customer development” approach
a decade earlier.25 Blank summarizes the difference
between the old “product development” methods and
the new approach:
The difference between the winners and losers is simple.
Products developed with senior management out in
front of customers early and often—win. Products
handed off to a sales and marketing organization that
has only been tangentially involved in the new product
development process lose. It’s that simple. . . . [Companies
designing new products win by] listening to potential
future customers [and] by going out into the field and
investigating potential customers’ needs and markets
before being inexorably committed to a specific path and
precise product specs.26

The “lean” approach is, in effect, iterative hypothesis testing. Instead of market research, product design,
launch, and marketing, the entrepreneur or intrapreneur launches a series of experiments in rapid succession to test hypotheses. These experiments include
“this specific customer segment in this specific market
needs these specific features to get this specific job
done,” “people who like this product will pay $X for
it every month,” “this particular marketing channel
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can reliably expose my product to potential customers
with adequate budgets,” and “this customer segment
will work X% more quickly by using my product.”
Then a simple prototype with minimal features is presented to actual representatives of the target market
(i.e., potential customers) to see how they behave in
response, and the results of those quick market tests
are used to validate the hypothesis or invalidate the
hypothesis. A product design and its accompanying business model, then, are treated as collections
of hypotheses, tested and revised repeatedly until a
set of hypotheses is found that generates the desired
response: customers actually purchasing a product.
The first version released in the market is sometimes
called a “minimally viable product” because new features will only be added to the product of future experiments to test new hypotheses about those features.
As noted previously, governments and military
institutions cannot be run like businesses because they
are responsible for much more than earning profits
for shareholders. Adopting lean and agile methods
is therefore significantly more complicated in public-sector organizations than in the private sector. Governments cannot generally refuse service to certain
citizens when inconvenienced the way businesses can
segment customer markets. Governments can reduce
waste, fraud, and cost, which are easy to measure, but
they are also responsible for equitable service provision and general societal welfare, which can be difficult
to measure reliably. Therefore, there is a risk that an
experiment that proves to yield one result measurably
might validate a hypothesis whose other results have
not even been tested. Governments tend to be massive
organizations in which no one manager has visibility
much less authority over the entirety of a process, and
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therefore the cultural mindsets and skills needed to
operate on lean principles are often lacking.
A key characteristic of a lean organization is its ability
to improve itself constantly by bringing problems to the
surface and resolving them. Here as well the public sector
often finds itself in a weaker starting position, with gaps
in skills and entrenched mind-sets. … Successful lean
transformations must close the capability gap early in the
process, so managers and staff can make the transition to
a new way of working. Closing the gap typically involves
hiring a few people with lean expertise and experience
from outside the public sector to seed the transformation
and build new internal capabilities.27

The first step in constructing experimental policy
approaches is to find the right personnel with the
appropriate skills and mindsets and give them
opportunities to experiment, fail, and try again without harming their careers. This seems more likely to
happen in one of the experimental offices mentioned
at the end of the previous section or in a new, separate initiative tasked with discovering approaches to
learn policy design that maximize the benefits of private-sector customer discovery, while overcoming the
limitations imposed by the nature of government service discussed earlier. The objective of such initiatives
would be a policymaking process capable of identifying specific types of problems frequently encountered
in conflict environments. They would draw on lessons
learned to develop hypotheses for how some particular aspect of the problem can be solved in context and
design a simple set of activities and resources (along
with specific measures of success) that can be tested
as a potential solution. They would implement it on a
small scale in context, measuring and comparing the
results to the hypothesis, then either redesigning the
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hypothesis and trying again if it fails or moving on to
test a different aspect of the hypothesized policy. After
discovering what works in context, the same process
can be used to test the hypothesis that the small-scale
version can be scaled up effectively.
When it comes to engaging in complex conflicts, it
is very difficult to experiment with new ways of doing
business amid active violence. In contexts with similar features as violent conflicts, it is possible to experiment with new approaches. Fragility is the laboratory
of complexity. Places that top various lists of “fragile
states” are usually the places where the most complex
conflicts break out. They are therefore ideal places
to practice new approaches to dealing with complex
conflicts—when violence is still at low enough levels
that it is possible to operate on the ground, learn the
internal dynamics, and experiment with agile decision
making and implementation processes. Experimenting with new processes in fragile states can therefore
accomplish two things: learning about operating in
complex conflict environments, and, ideally if probably only occasionally, preventing violent conflict from
erupting in the first place.
BECOMING MORE SYSTEMIC
Before the age of electronics, scientists who studied human societies used intuition, keen observation,
history, and good record keeping to develop theories
explaining the dynamics of social, political, and economic systems. For example, Max Weber explained a
century ago that the dynamics of social stability would
include sophisticated descriptions of what today
would be termed feedback loops and adaptive behavior. People hold beliefs about how other people expect
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them to act, so they avoid social disapproval by acting
in ways consistent with those beliefs, which then provides public evidence to others that certain behaviors
are or are not acceptable, which reinforces the norm,
and so on.28
Once humans figured out that machines could
make complicated mathematical calculations, the need
arose for better and better ways to instruct machines
how to do so. That led not only to the development
of sophisticated methods for studying and controlling
systems such as radar antennas and air-defense systems, but also to the realization that key insights from
the study of electronic systems can be applied to social
systems as well. Dynamic modeling, simulation of
organizations, and even more complex human systems had thus become possible by the 1950s.
From the beginning, the entities most interested
in being able to simulate the complex dynamics their
organizations faced were large corporations and the
military.29 General Electric (GE) asked Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) engineer Jay Forrester
in the mid-1950s to help them understand puzzling
fluctuations in their business cycle. Forrester used
the knowledge he had acquired designing electronic
systems and servomechanisms for the Navy during
World War II to demonstrate that GE’s fluctuations
were caused by management decisions rather than
market conditions—and he invented system dynamics
as a discrete field of practice in the process.30 He later
partnered with a former mayor of Boston to apply his
methods to urban dynamics, and the book that resulted
launched broad interest in systems thinking as a mindset for studying complex social systems—from organizational dynamics to global dynamics.31
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Since then, systems-oriented modeling techniques
have been recommended and used for designing war
games, modeling conflicts, integrating joint operations, planning operations, and making operational
decisions in the field, among other applications.32 The
Army recognized the complexity of its operating environment a decade ago and updated its field manual on
the operations process with a section on “agile design
for complex environments.”33 Around the same time
and in response to the same challenges, the Defense
Department attempted to introduce “adaptive planning” techniques.34 In chapter 2, we reviewed some of
the voluminous research that has treated conflicts as
complex systems over the past decade or so. Today, in
Washington, DC, there is hardly a conference or think
tank report on conflict, fragility, or international development that fails to mention the complexity of such
environments and the importance of understanding
them in “systems,” “design,” “lean,” or “agile” terms.
Why, then, is systems thinking still so strongly
resisted among policymakers, planners, strategists,
monitoring and evaluation specialists, and even peace
and conflict scholars and policy researchers? What
can be done to overcome that resistance? The case of a
famous PowerPoint slide illustrates both the promise
of systems thinking and the barriers to its widespread
adoption. The details matter because they demonstrate
good systems thinking in action—through both formal
methods and instinct—as well as some of the limits
to what systems approaches are able to accomplish
under current institutional arrangements and cultural
tendencies. The concluding section that follows offers
thoughts for overcoming the key challenges the case
uncovers.
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In December 2006, the same month the Army
and Marines published their joint counterinsurgency
(COIN) manual,35 a Navy captain and test pilot named
Brett Pierson became the Irregular Warfare Branch
Chief at the Joint Staff’s J8 Warfighting Analysis Division, where he was to develop better modeling and
simulation tools for COIN analysis. COIN doctrine is
explicit that the factors affecting success are abundant
and highly interrelated. In other words, insurgencies
are complex conflicts, and Pierson recognized that
methods such as agent-based modeling, wargames,
and system dynamics modeling were designed for the
study of precisely such circumstances. Among other
work, his team therefore used system dynamics techniques to model the new COIN manual. In briefing his
work, he was careful to lead his audience through the
reasons system dynamics (SD) was the right approach,
how SD works, and how his team (working with external systems experts at Boeing, MIT, Old Dominion
University, and the PA Consulting Group) built up
their SD model of COIN doctrine.
In at least one version of the briefing materials (i.e.,
PowerPoint slides36), they started by identifying the
three tasks the COIN manual argues are the objectives
of COIN strategy: getting supporters of insurgents to
become neutral, getting neutral individuals to support the host government, and getting supporters of
the host government to stay supportive. From there,
the presentation showed what factors directly influence those objectives (portrayed using arrows to show
the direction of influence). It showed what additional
objectives influence those factors, and on and on, until
a complete model of COIN doctrine took up an entire
slide filled with words and arrows in what is known
as an influence map or causal loop diagram. The briefing materials then demonstrated how to interpret the
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diagram for analytic purposes. They even ended with
a slide showing a separate causal loop diagram of campaign design.
In other words, a decade ago, Pierson’s team put
both systems of the dual-system problem into one
presentation using an appropriate methodology for
understanding them! (For his team’s work, Pierson
won the 2007 Department of Defense Modeling and
Simulation Award for Excellence.)37
Then he went to Afghanistan as an adviser to General Stanley McChrystal. McChrystal was instinctively
receptive to systems thinking already. His reforms of
the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Iraq
and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) globally had demonstrated that it actually was possible to
transform large, lumbering bureaucracies into an agile,
networked organization, a “team of teams” capable of
operating successfully in a complex conflict system.
He successfully persuaded the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA),
and other agencies to agree to work in the field as a
single unit in real time.38
When McChrystal was promoted to commander
of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
in the summer of 2009, Pierson’s team briefed him on
their systems dynamics work. By then, the briefing
materials had been updated with Afghanistan-specific
dynamics.39 One slide showed a colorful version of the
full-model causal loop diagram. When McChrystal saw
it, he reportedly quipped, “When we understand that
slide, we’ll have won the war.”40 Within months, that
slide and that quip had escaped into public awareness,
thanks to MSNBC’s Richard Engel, who reported in a
December 2009 blog posting that the “attempt to visualize the strategy reveals how immensely complicated
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it is for U.S. forces to accomplish” its objectives in
Afghanistan.41 A few months later, a New York Times
writer held it up as an example of the military’s pathological dependence on PowerPoint as a tool for communication, comparing the causal-loop slide to “a bowl of
spaghetti.”42 From there, Pierson’s work soon became
publicly derided as the “Afghanistan spaghetti chart.”
Even Jon Stewart of Comedy Central’s The Daily Show
did a segment mocking it; at one point comparing it
to a circuit diagram of a funny-sounding electronic
musical instrument (likely, without realizing that circuit diagrams and causal loop diagrams both represent
dynamic systems).43
The public criticisms of Pierson’s work wrongly
conflated standard PowerPoint slide designs that tend
not to communicate complexity adequately—with
system dynamics modeling, which is designed specifically to represent complexity. Most also focused only
on that one slide and not on the rest of the presentations, which in fact had done a good job of explaining
the need for dynamic modeling techniques to be used
in complex conflict environments:
System dynamics modeling . . . provides a platform for:
effectively framing issues and problems; representing the
essence of the interdependencies that underlie system
performance; minimizing policy resistance; reliably
inferring the dynamics associated with a set of initiatives;
[and] communicating—creating a single ‘sheet of music’
to play.”44

As one of Pierson’s briefing slides notes, system
dynamics are “Very difficult to communicate!”45
A number of systems thinkers tried defending the
work behind the causal loop diagram, including the
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executive chairman of one of the contractors on the
project:
This chart was published [in newspapers] without context;
it was designed to be part of a broad briefing, where it
was slowly revealed alongside a verbal description of
each major element. [Its public mockery] was a dream for
those wanting to respond trivially. But do we really want
simplistic philosophies to win out in defense thinking?
Do we want strategies developed that take no account of
complexity and the sometimes-counterintuitive outcomes
of well-intentioned actions? We should support dynamic
thinking and duck the temptations of over-simplistic
linear thinking.46

Another argued that public reporting on this episode
missed “a chance to consider how PowerPoint really
does lead to oversimplification . . . and the chance
to consider the real complexity of the situation in
Afghanistan, something that too many would prefer
to ignore”:
This diagram is nothing to laugh at, and nothing to
make fun of. This diagram is something to celebrate,
because it shows us that our military leaders are trying
to take a systems approach to the complex problems in
Afghanistan. The opposite of a laughable waste of energy,
this particular causal loop diagram has been held up (in
scientific circles) as a masterful example of how to make
complex systems simple enough to understand.47

Unfortunately, public derision is not the worst part
of this story. The worst part is that its main message
was not absorbed by the very policy system it was
intended to help. To his credit, McChrystal had already
succeeded in making JSOTF and JSOC and their interagency partners more systemic—and more successful—in an exceedingly complex conflict environment
by the time he encountered this particular briefing. He
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was then promoted to commander of ISAF in Afghanistan, where he now was in charge of all U.S. and NATO
forces there. Replicating his success at a much larger
scale turned out to be difficult.
At JSOTF and JSOC, McChrystal had been able to
harmonize the contributions of multiple, competing
offices, which reduced the number of separate inputs
and therefore the complexity of the decision making
and implementation system operating in theater. In
other words, he did not turn a bureaucracy into a network so much as he turned a complex system into a
less complex system. He might not have realized that
what he was doing was weakening unseen, policy-resisting, negative feedback loops. That is what he did—
and that reduction in complexity produced better and
more predictable outputs (i.e., targeting and other
operational decisions). At ISAF, at the strategic level,
however, there were far more actors, with far more
competing incentives, making it much more difficult to
find ways to harmonize their contributions and make
their collective output more predictable. Some missteps by McChrystal alienated partners he needed on
his side for his reforms to take effect.48 It seems efforts
to reduce the complexity of a policy system are always
going to meet resistance.
Even if McChrystal’s earlier innovation had worked
at ISAF, the dual-system challenge remained. Outputs
of a less complex policy system were still always going
to be inputs into the complex conflict system that is
Afghanistan. Killing individuals, taking their property
for intelligence purposes, and immediately using that
intelligence operationally—one of JSOC’s more successful innovations—undeniably had the desired effect
on a key subsystem within that conflict. Those operational successes never translated into strategic victory
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in Afghanistan: other subsystems, inputs, and feedback loops within the conflict system repeatedly counteracted them—just as the system dynamics models
on which Pierson had briefed McChrystal’s team had
warned they would.
Being able to map out potential second- and higher-order effects, it turns out, really is essential to translating operational success into strategic victory. That is
as true for political leaders and civilian agencies as it
is for military organizations. All will need to solve the
dual-system problem before they can expect to protect
U.S. interests and contribute to a stable international
order in the future.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS
Where does this leave us in terms of helping the
United States and its allies become more systemic,
more experimental, and more entrepreneurial in their
approaches to complex foreign policy problems? The
cases of international criminal law and knowledge
institutions discussed in chapter 4 demonstrated the
challenge of operating through two complex systems at once (the dual-system problem). The Pierson
case demonstrated both the promise that at least one
approach to systems thinking has for overcoming
the dual-system problem as well as the challenges of
communicating that approach. The McChrystal case
demonstrated both the promise and the challenges of
integrating systems thinking into everyday practice: it
is possible, but it is difficult.
To overcome these challenges, policy researchers,
peace and conflict scholars, consultants, strategists,
planners, and funders of research will need to address
three sets of issues: how systems are studied, how the
results are communicated, and how resistance to new
thinking is overcome. The remainder of this monograph takes up each challenge in turn.
STUDYING SYSTEMS
Systems thinking is a mindset, or way of thinking
about the world, that has been formalized methodologically through a number of approaches that facilitate studying, designing, operating in, or influencing
complex or dynamic systems.1
• Systems engineering is used for designing
dynamic (usually electronic) systems, while
systems analysis is a systematic approach to
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•
•

•

•

•

•
•

studying different ways components can be
combined to form larger systems (such as acquisition systems, assembly lines, or building systems), often using economic or game theory
methods.2
Systems architecting shifts the focus of analysis
in systems engineering from system structure to
system impacts.3
The “systems decision process” is a technique
of managing system design processes that
focuses on the particularities of a system and its
lifecycle.4
System dynamics as a technique and community of practice has already been discussed in
this chapter, but much of the work involves
modeling and simulation of stocks and flows
in dynamic systems for the purpose of understanding and influencing system performance.5
War gaming and qualitative simulation are
exercises in experiential learning that can offer
insight into how best to interact with complex
systems (see “Simulation” in chapter 3).
Iterative hypothesis testing and grounded
theory are similar to “agile” software development and “lean” approaches used by entrepreneurs to test product designs and business
models against complex market conditions (see
the first two sections of this chapter).
Certain critical-thinking frameworks help organize research questions that would need to be
asked to make systems research complete.6
Network analysis is a robust set of tools for
understanding and influencing a full range of
networked structures within complex systems.7

122

• Adaptive agent modeling is used to simulate
and discover the rules and incentives individuals (agents) face in complex interactions and the
sometimes surprising effects their individual
behaviors have in aggregate.8
• Collective strategy is a synthesis of systems
methods designed to identify what it would
take to solve large-scale social problems, partly
by identifying what entities have influence over
key leverage points in both problem systems
and problem-solving systems.9
• Design thinking and political economy analysis
have the potential to be adapted to understanding complex environments as well.10
Given that such a wide range of methods exists
for understanding and influencing complex systems,
it is puzzling that so many policy researchers—whose
jobs are to translate research methods and results into
actionable recommendations for policymakers faced
with complex decisions—still default to a handful of
methods that either are not robust or not appropriate
for dynamic interactions. Some analytic frameworks
are little more than laundry lists of factors with no systematic attempt to account for how those factors interact; scales derived from them might weigh different
factors in different ways, but the scoring and indexes
they produce are generally of questionable policy
value. Many case studies demonstrate little more
than the presence or absence of certain factors under
different conditions. Where quantitative data are collected, the analysis sometimes amounts to little more
than a study of correlations between variables, even
though correlations between two variables embedded
in dynamic systems that include time delays, resource
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accumulations, and feedback loops are often mathematically and substantively meaningless. Regression
analysis can lead to questionable results when the
variables in the model are not truly independent, as
is obviously the case in complex environments. Yet
these methods—all of which are completely valid and
often very useful in specific circumstances—seem to
be the ones most commonly employed in think tank
reports and policy memos, even on topics the authors
themselves recognize are complex or dynamic. Policy
researchers and strategists would be significantly
more useful to decision-makers if more would learn
and employ systems-appropriate research methods.
Those methods should be used not just to study
complex conflicts but also complex policy systems. The
Defense Department instituted adaptive planning, but
it eventually reverted to older approaches.11 McChrystal
could not replicate his successful operational reforms
at the strategic level. Many lessons derived from experience and research in complex environments have
failed to be institutionalized, even after many decades
of being studied and recommended. International
criminal law, seeking to deter and prosecute atrocities,
often neither deters nor prosecutes. These are different examples of policy resistance and constraints on
policy uptake—dynamics that could be uncovered
and addressed more readily if more research energy
was put into the study of policy resistance. Co-author Robert Lamb is collaborating with several system
dynamics experts to develop a dynamic model of the
U.S. policy system explicitly for the purpose of uncovering systemic factors that constrain policy uptake of
repeated recommendations for changes in foreign policy.12 (We are testing the model on policy resistance
to adequate investments in civilian stabilization and
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reconstruction capabilities.) Significantly more work
like that is required for a wide variety of policy issues
that are systemically resisted.
COMMUNICATING COMPLEXITY
A circuit diagram is a model of an electronic system.
Most people looking at a circuit diagram would probably find it too complicated to understand, but they
would likely trust that the model is a useful tool and
that the electronic engineers who produced it had the
specialized training needed to design a system that
would work. Similarly, a causal-loop diagram is a
model of a social system, and it is too complicated for
most people to understand. Why did journalists and
comedians react to the Afghanistan spaghetti chart
with disdain rather than trust that the model is a useful
tool? Why did people not trust that its designers had
the specialized training needed to build a model of a
complex social system?
Part of the reason is probably discomfort with the
idea of social engineering: humans are not machines,
and societies should not be treated as engineered systems. But a circuit diagram can also be developed
as a model of a found object rather than a designed
object—say, an enemy machine recovered by an intelligence service—and can therefore be an example not
of engineering but of reverse engineering. That is more
or less what a causal-loop diagram of a social system
is: a model of a “found” system rather than a designed
system, which has been reversed-engineered into a
dynamic model. The founder of system dynamics
summarized why many people are uneasy with the
entire concept:
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The idea of a social system implies . . . that people are not
entirely free agents but are substantially responsive to
their surroundings. To put the matter even more bluntly,
if human systems are indeed systems, it implies that
people are at least partly cogs in a social and economic
machine, that people play their roles within the totality of
the whole system, and that they respond in a significantly
predictable way to forces brought to bear on them by
other parts of the system [italics in original].13

Yet behavioral science has demonstrated that people
do indeed “respond in a significantly predictable way
to forces brought to bear on them.” We know this
because corporations use the insights of behavioral
science to get people to spend more money than they
intend and political consultants regularly employ scientifically discovered “nudging” techniques to make
people angry with political opponents.
Still, even a reverse-engineered circuit diagram
can be used to build a new system, and the confidence
people have in electrical engineering has to do with
the knowledge that useful objects are built based on
circuit designs. Complex, adaptive social systems are
not and cannot be designed the same way. Certainly,
simulations can make it possible to design strategies to
influence social systems, but most people are entirely
unaware of any cases where that has happened. Systems thinkers therefore need to do a better job of
communicating how often systems methods produce
actionable results—such as dynamic business models
used to test alternative business strategies, a common
application—or perhaps they need to produce more
actionable models in the first place.14
It might be useful as well to engage in more research
on user experiences of systems models to find ways of
portraying and presenting them that do not generate
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the nearly universal confusion generated by causal-loop diagrams (and their more methodologically
precise cousins, stock-and-flow diagrams). Ecologist
Eric Berlow has argued that, in many complex systems, the specific factors of concern often turn out to
have highly localized spheres of influence and therefore have simple explanations—but you first have
to model the complexity to find that simplicity. To
demonstrate his point, he remodeled the Afghanistan
spaghetti diagram as an ordered network to make it
easier to visualize, then focused on the node of greatest
interest—popular support for the government—and
the nodes connected to it most closely, up to 3 degrees
away (i.e., the local sphere of influence). That eliminated three-quarters of the factors in the full diagram,
and most of the factors remaining in the local sphere
of influence were “not actionable, like the harshness of
the terrain.” Aside from military force, what remained
in Berlow’s visualization as factors most influencing
popular support were “active engagement with ethnic
rivalries and religious beliefs” and “fair, transparent economic development and provisioning of services.”15 This is a much simpler strategy than what the
visualization of the full model suggested, yet it is still
very similar to the recommended strategy produced
by teams of system dynamics consultants working
with Pierson at J8.
Some systems thinkers working as management
consultants have discovered that clients are much more
receptive to systems thinking if they can see the model
or the solution being developed in front of their eyes
based on answers they themselves give to the consultant’s questions about the business problem.16 “Early
system dynamics analyses were in the ‘consultant’
mode in which the system dynamicist would study
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a corporation, go away and build a model, and come
back with recommendations,” the first system dynamics consultant once wrote. “Usually these suggestions
would be accepted as a logical argument, but would
not alter behavior. Under pressure of daily operations,
decisions would revert to prior practice.”17
Another consultant who advises businesses on
dynamics affecting their performance has compared
standard approaches for developing dynamic models
to the way software companies used to design their
products—the “waterfall” approach, which:
starts with identifying the full scope of the desired
solution, then attempts to define the entire architecture of
the application to be developed, before the whole solution
is coded. The software is then tested and debugged,
before being installed for users to employ.18

As a result, standard approaches to system dynamics
have been “widely viewed as taking too long, costing too much, and delivering uncertain value.” He
proposed adopting “agile system dynamics” as an
approach that builds the diagram with the client in real
time but also creates a working model simultaneously
instead of at a later stage so the client can see preliminary results as early as the first meeting, encouraging
buy-in.19 Others have made similar suggestions:
Except in rare circumstances, don’t tell your managers that
they must adopt systems thinking. … Your bosses will be
more likely to hear you if you help them achieve their goals
than if you ask them to adopt your tools. … If a manager
presents you with a problem, work with him to solve
it. Solicit the information you need while you’re sitting
with him, and capture the key aspects of the situation on
paper in front of him. Scribble down statements, data,
and fragments of stock and flow diagrams. Accept the
manager’s input about the diagram.20
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The advice to consider the perspective of the user—to
begin where the client is and take them step by step on
the journey—is an important consideration in getting
systems thinking to be adopted more widely.
OVERCOMING RESISTANCE
When it comes to complex foreign crises, diplomatic challenges, and international legal considerations, the U.S. federal workforce (civilian and
military) contains many pockets of excellence, expertise, and experience—alongside sclerotic processes
for budgeting, planning, contracting, hiring, security,
and widespread ignorance about the complexity of
how our own policy systems actually function. The
United States, like the international community more
broadly, therefore is simply not organized to deal with
the complex conflicts it is already engaged in. The best
we likely can expect today is skilled improvisation,
lucky breaks, slow progress, and perhaps generous
humanitarian assistance to relieve the suffering we are
unable to prevent. If we want to do more, we will need
to discover new and better ways to simplify our own
complex policy system and overcome the resistance
often encountered when attempting to implement best
practices.
Overcoming policy resistance and policy stasis is
one of the most difficult tasks decision-makers face.
Some individuals are skilled at discovering hidden
obstacles within their own institutions and are savvy
enough bureaucratic or political operators to find ways
around them. Most are not. Instead, they spend their
careers learning organizational processes, management techniques, and institutional doctrines that enable
them to carry out specific tasks and tactics, design and
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manage programs and operations, and translate their
leaders’ policies and strategies into practical plans and
commander’s intent. In most cases, the human mind
is capable of understanding what it takes to make
those processes work—the number of interrelated considerations is small enough that systems thinking is
unnecessary and linear thinking is desirable (as when
a command needs simply to be obeyed). Tradeoffs
exist, and unintended consequences are possible—
and common—at all levels, of course, and especially
at the level of programming and operations, those can
get very complicated. Some of the biggest career challenges still come at the leap from operations to strategy, from planning and managing practical operations
to designing strategies to implement policy decisions
on complicated topics in complex environments.
That is because it is at the strategic level that some
of the most difficult tradeoffs and risks present themselves. The human brain evolved during a period
when social systems were fairly simple, but our social
systems have evolved much more quickly than our
own biological systems. Today our societies are simply
too complex for a single human mind to comprehend
fully.21 In complex systems, there can be long delays
(and intervening variables) between causes and effects,
making it easy to mistake one cause for another. Circular causation between variables can turn seemingly
insignificant acts into sources of massive disruption
and seemingly significant acts into minor distractions.
That is a key reason so many policy mistakes are made.
It is why self-fulfilling prophecies and unintended consequences exist, why short-term fixes can lead to longterm disasters, and why well-intended policies can be
resisted without anyone intending to resist them—
or even being conscious of the resistance. Donella
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Meadows attributed policy resistance to bounded
rationality in the pursuit of competing goals:
Each actor monitors the state of the system with regard to
some important variable—income or prices or housing or
drugs or investment—and compares that state with his,
her, or its goal. If there is a discrepancy, each actor does
something to correct the situation. Usually the greater the
discrepancy between the goal and the actual situation,
the more emphatic the action will be. Such resistance
to change arises when goals of subsystems are different
from and inconsistent with each other.22

There are three overarching approaches to overcoming
policy resistance: dominance, inaction, and harmonization. Each can be an appropriate or inappropriate
strategy, depending on the structure of the system in
question.
In a dominance strategy, the decision-maker uses
overwhelming force in an effort to overpower the
sources of resistance inside the system. In this way,
a military leader might plan a “shock and awe” campaign of rapid dominance in battle, an authoritarian
leader might brutally suppress domestic political dissent, a corporate leader might order mass layoffs in a
division to suppress union activity, or a “big push”
international development campaign might try to
jump-start a virtuous economic cycle with an influx of
foreign capital.23 Dominance can backfire spectacularly
in systems where the resisting subsystems are tightly
coupled or act in concert and where the delays in feedback are brief. Long delays and loosely coupled subsystems might make dominance a potentially winning
strategy24—at least until the overwhelming power is
withdrawn (as when authoritarian leaders of divided
societies die or are overthrown).
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Strategic inaction is probably the least appreciated
approach to dealing with resistance, but it is entirely
appropriate in the archetypical situations where taking
action would only make the problem worse. In most
social and political systems, however, people expect
their leaders to do something. A strategy of inaction
can therefore end up reinforcing the demand for action,
which can eventually force the decision-maker’s hand
or cause a change in leadership to people promising
action. For that reason, strategic inaction requires
either strong, legitimate leaders who can withstand
criticism for allowing short-term failures, or a parallel strategy of distraction, misinformation, or political
theater to make people think action is actually taking
place when it is not.
Harmonization begins with a focus on subsystems
to identify, build support for, or create incentives to
adopt a set of goals and techniques on which the most
significant subsystems can agree. In divided societies,
for example, different population groups sometimes
put aside their differences to defend themselves collectively against a common threat such as a war or natural disaster. People and organizations concerned about
policy resistance to climate action worked to harmonize the goals and strategies of otherwise divided
groups—activists, scientists, media, businesses, government officials, educators, etc.—and after a few
years of harmonization, they managed to achieve a
collective impact that had evaded them for decades:
the Paris climate agreement, signed in late 2015.25 The
most effective leaders of organizations and movements
find a way to harmonize goals so that strategic inaction
or dominance can be avoided.26
Employing systems-appropriate research methods;
engaging in new research on policy resistance; learning
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how to communicate systems thinking to key staff and
decision makers; and experimenting with new ways to
make, implement, and learn from successes and failures do not require bureaucratic reorganizations or
radical departures from current practice. However,
they do require that systems thinking, entrepreneurial mindsets, a willingness to experiment, and skillful engagement with complex situations be rewarded
by leaders and decision makers at all levels and in all
functions—some of whom will resist such changes.
Understanding the sources of such resistance is therefore the most important first step.
We must study sources of policy resistance within
our own policy systems at least as systematically as we
study paths to victory in foreign conflicts and political factors in stabilization and reconstruction in foreign countries. Otherwise, we are doomed to continue
repeating the same mistakes for another 65 years and
to lose more and more influence in the world over time.
A political system is weakest when it refuses to learn
the mistakes of the past; American democracy is strongest when it heeds the knowledge held, and sometimes
hidden, within its own people and institutions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY
The boundary between the two systems—the complex policy system and the complex conflict system—
is not always, and perhaps not usually, going to be
clear. Those who sit at the boundary between policy
and implementation or between strategy and operations are therefore the ones who need to be most aware
of the dual-system problem. They are the ones who
receive the outputs of the policy system (“this is what
we are trying to achieve, and how we think we can get
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there”) and are expected to turn them into inputs to the
conflict system (“this is specifically how we are going
to get there”).
In the Army, that means officers from lieutenant
colonel through brigadier general need to be trained
and educated in a way that inculcates a systemic
mindset in themselves and, at the very least, encourages them to recognize and reward experimental and
entrepreneurial tendencies in their subordinates. This
is particularly the case for planning staff, as Lindsay
Cohn argues:
Any officer who is going to be sent to a planning staff
should have to go to an in-residence war college
program that teaches (a) U.S. government and politics,
(b) international relations, (c) military history, (d) joint
operations and ops planning, and (e) war gaming and
simulation. [They] need both the ability to think flexibly
and creatively and a decent level of understanding of the
systems in which they are operating, and you get that
from a curriculum including the above five things. They
need to be comfortable with complexity and ambiguity;
they need to feel like it’s okay to guess and to learn from
being wrong; they need to have the humility that comes
from learning just how much there is to know, and how
nearly impossible it is for anyone to know it all. . . . They
need to understand the system that produces policy, so
that they can both contribute to it (through planning) and
interpret it when it comes to them as guidance, and they
need to understand the conflict system so that they can
think creatively, not get frustrated, and work together
with other actors (U.S., local, and international) without
feeling like those other actors are either interfering in
a “military job” or shirking their jobs and making the
military do a “non-military job.”27

To this, we would add explicit training in systems
thinking, including how to be an intelligent consumer
of dynamic models (especially system, network, and
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adaptive agent models) and how to assign work (e.g.,
commander’s intent, requests for proposals, assessments, wargame design). This must be done in a way
that ensures the results will adequately account for
systemic complexity and dynamic interactions, and
recognizes when requirements (of a policy, strategy, or
doctrine) simply cannot be fulfilled by existing institutions (e.g., identifying unstated assumptions about
what is and is not possible).28
In fact, training in systems thinking would be useful
in many areas beyond planning, including the development of joint concepts, doctrine, wargaming, and
force development.29 Joint concepts and doctrine need
to do a better job of considering the delivery capacity
of the U.S. Government as a whole when articulating
expectations.30 For example, it is unrealistic to expect
large numbers of U.S. troops to be available over long
periods of time or host-nation partners in countries at
war genuinely to share U.S. objectives and doctrines. If
a requirement of any kind (in strategy, operations, or
tactics) identifies a level of performance that has never
been achieved before, it should not be promulgated
until all of the factors affecting performance have been
identified and their complex interrelationships clearly
articulated.31 Wargaming in particular can be a useful
way to imbue leaders with systems thinking if the simulations are designed to include second- and third-order effects, feedback loops, and causal delays—to
demonstrate to participants that operational successes
cannot be turned into strategic victories without
accounting for them.32 Force development and operations more generally can take a lesson from McCrystal’s experiences at Joint Special Operations Command
and International Security Assistance Force. Joint Staff
and Combatant Commands, especially in the Middle
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East and Africa, should recognize the shortcomings of
the strategy-to-tasks approach to security cooperation
in complex conflict situations and should again begin
experimenting with more agile or adaptive planning
processes.33
There will always be a place in military institutions for commanders to expect subordinates to obey
orders, and there will always be an expectation by
elected and appointed civilian leaders that their decisions will be implemented with their intent intact.
Harmonized responses to complex situations are more
effective than complex responses are. Whole-of-government implementation is a failed dream. Repeatedly
insisting how important it is will never be enough to
overcome the many sources of resistance to full interagency coordination if those barriers are never systematically identified in the first place. Shifting from
“whole-of-government” to “systemic governance” is
therefore a necessity. The Army has the motivation
and resources to lead that shift.
The motivation is clear: the Army is expected to
work through complex policy systems to make strategies and plan operations, and it is expected to fight
battles and build relationships in complex war zones.
Army personnel are already positioned throughout the
policy system—permanently or on rotation—and on
the boundary between the policy system and conflict
systems. It is well positioned to influence the broader
policy system by planting seeds of change in mindsets
and practices that are needed to succeed in complex
environments. Its education, training, and doctrine
institutions are supposed to be designed to adapt as
global conditions change, and the key adaptation today
is to become more systemic, more entrepreneurial, and
more experimental. That is as true for political leaders
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and civilian agencies as it is for military organizations.
All will need to solve the dual-system problem before
they can expect to protect U.S. interests and contribute
to a stable international order in the future.
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